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N,IO STATE in the Union has a seal more appropriate than
Kentucky's. I do not refer exclusively to Kentucky's motto—
"United We Stand, Divided We Fall"—but emphasize the
figures appearing on the seal. One is a gentleman in formal
attire, the other a frontiersman in buckskin; and the two are
shaking hands. The two figures symbolize, as no other pattern
could, the two principal human (or at least male) ingredients
of early Kentucky.
The frontiersman's influence of course came first. It is not
hard to convince book readers or television viewers of the un-
doubted accomplishments and fame of Kentucky's pioneers.
Daniel Boone is known the nation over. And such other
frontier figures as George Rogers Clark and Simon Kenton are
familiar to numerous modern Americans. Kentucky has an ex-
cellent claim to the title of the "First West." Log cabins, log
houses, and log forts—known as "stations" and erected for
protection from Indian assaults—reflected the norm of
pioneer times. The first Kentucky frontiersmen and their fami-
lies were continually aware of perils surrounding them and
were every bit as inured to primitive conditions as subsequent
settlers in the Far West. Boonesborough and Harrodsburg are
well-remembered symbols of what living was like when Ken-
tucky was young. But residents of many other locales, includ-
ing those that became Louisville and Lexington, shared the
common experiences of frontier life.
Although fundamentally western, Kentucky in its youth—
and ever after—likewise was characterized by an eastern her-
itage identified with the Atlantic Seaboard. Originally part of
Virginia, Kentucky was populated mainly by men, women,
and children from Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina.
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Many of these were plain, roughhewn people with little or no
exposure to assets—material or cultural—prior to crossing the
mountains to their new Kentucky homes. Still, a substantial
minority of those who came before 1800 had moved in ben-
eficial social circles in the East. Such early Kentucky leaders
as George Nicholas and John Breckinridge of Virginia and
John Wesley Hunt of New Jersey had made the most of edu-
cational opportunities and had developed cultural standards as
high as those of their eastern contemporaries. Moreover, they
came west soon after the period of wilderness penetration.
Thus Kentucky was quickly characterized by a prominent mix
and mingle of eastern gentility and frontier earthiness.
One of the most remarkable developments was that of Lex-
ington—the Athens of the West. Why did Lexington's popula-
tion include so many residents of unusual quality? The most
deterministic cause may be found in—of all things—faulty
land titles. For Kentucky inherited Virginia's land "system,"
or lack of system, as a result of which two or more claimants to
parcels of property often became enmeshed in litigation. As
much of the best land lay in the Lexington vicinity or in cen-
tral Kentucky's adjacent counties, the town and its environs
became a happy hunting ground for lawyers from the East.
Skilled attorneys practicing in Lexington had ready access to
cash income and opportunities to buy good land for them-
selves. They brought attractive wives with them to the Blue-
grass or married lovely daughters of other "first families."
They built stately mansions and, when children blessed their
households, they thought not merely of elementary schooling
but of secondary and even higher education. More than any
other single distinction, it was Transylvania University (the
"university across the woods") that gave this western "Athens"
its cultural tone.
Louisville had a different sort of special reason for growing
into an important community. Located at the Falls of the
Ohio, it was a natural tarrying place for boatmen and
passengers journeying on one of America's major rivers. As
traffic and transportation burgeoned in the era of the steam-
boat, Louisville would shoot past Lexington in population and
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become Kentucky's largest city. Long before that, former
field-grade officers of the Revolutionary War settled in Jeffer-
son County on the periphery of Louisville and occupied posi-
tions of leadership. Like their counterparts in the Bluegrass
and in every area where conditions for farming were especially
propitious, these people—most of them Virginians—brought
the institution of slavery.
Kentucky thus was a "southern" state in the sense that it was
a "slave state," and also in the sense that well-to-do Virginians'
architectural and other cultural tastes now were transferred
west of the mountains. Yet not all Kentuckians settled on good
land. Not all Kentuckians could afford mansions. Not all could
afford slaves, especially settlers at the heads of hollows in
eastern Kentucky. Thousands of poor whites and industrious,
frugal, but by no means wealthy yeoman farmers also lived in
northern Kentucky, the Green River country, and elsewhere
from the winding Ohio all the way to the Tennessee line. In
the 1790s, because of their numbers, there even developed a
movement to eliminate slavery in Kentucky. And, while this
proposal went down to defeat, the presence of numerous
slaveless whites was a factor in keeping Kentucky substantially
less southern than western.
The "westernness" of Kentucky was partially exemplified by
the career of Henry Clay. At the turn of the century this
promising Virginia lawyer settled in Lexington in his early
twenties and immediately won recognition at the bar. Marry-
ing a Kentucky heiress, he acquired land and slaves—building
upon his legal reputation as a politician and going to the
United States Senate before he was thirty years old. In and out
of Congress time and again between 1806 and 1852, Clay al-
most certainly would have been prime minister if we had had
the British political system.
Aspiring to the presidency on five occasions, Clay never
achieved that cherished goal. Yet he was one of the three or
four most prominent statesmen of his generation—a rep-
resentative of western thinking and feeling, albeit with a
southern exposure. The programs he advocated and the
policies he endorsed were, for the most part, national in
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nature. And it is significant that Clay became known not as
Harry of the South but as Harry of the West.
In analyzing reasons for this able man's failure to attain the
pinnacle of power and prestige, one should not minimize acci-
dents of politics—unpredictable developments that become
career pivots. But one wonders whether Clay was not too
much the Virginian, too much the aristocrat, too imperious to
suit the preferences of his times. Andrew Jackson, not only a
soldier but a lawyer and slaveholder identified with neigh-
boring Tennessee, had—in the eyes of voters—a degree of
westernness more western than Clay's own. And it may be
meaningful that no Virginian or other southerner, mainly
bracketed with a southern seaboard state (unless Zachary Tay-
lor is incorrectly seen that way), was elected to the highest
office after 1820 until 1964. Those southerners who won in the
1825-50 period were western-oriented southerners or, more
properly, southern-oriented westerners—Jackson being the
most popular.
Parts of this book deal with two presidents of the United
States, one serving at the end of that same quarter century,
the other coming along slightly later. Looking at their lives in
outline form in biographical encyclopedias, one might suppose
that Zachary Taylor and Abraham Lincoln had little in com-
mon aside from finishing first  in their respective campaigns.
Lincoln's profession was the law, his political experience con-
siderable, his reading wide, his thinking deep, his chosen res-
idence prior to the White House the capital city of a free state.
A career soldier who spent forty years in the army, Taylor
neither read widely nor thought deeply on most subjects, nor
took any part in politics prior to his role as a presidential
candidate. Taylor, moreover, was a slaveholder from young
manhood until he died. A cotton planter for nearly thirty
years, with plantations in Mississippi and Louisiana, he made
the latter state his home when elevated to the executive man-
sion. How utterly different, at first glance, could the back-
grounds of two men be?
Yet, in his late thirties and early forties, Lincoln enormously
admired Taylor. As we shall see, the future sixteenth presi-
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dent worked energetically for the twelfth president's election.
And when the slave-owning Taylor died, the Great Emanci-
pator-to-be eulogized his fallen chief in a way demonstrating
not only loyalty but also well-nigh incredible prescience.
For reasons that will be set forth, few students—except for
experts—have appreciated this link. The striking similarity of
the Taylor and Lincoln points of view on transcendent public
issues of their times has been widely overlooked. In their
interpretations of the federal Union, in their resolute devotion
to it, and in their insistence on slavery's containment, the
free-state Lincoln and the slave-state Taylor were virtually
identical.
Taylor is the only president to have lived in Kentucky a
great many years. The westernness of Kentucky became part
of his marrow. Inheriting the slaveholding practice of older
Kentuckians in and out of his family, he also inherited their
Unionism. The bulk of his military service took place in the
Northwest and Southwest, where Taylor's westernness was re-
inforced, and his Unionism with it. Both Taylor and Henry
Clay (whom he defeated for the Whig nomination) were
premier Unionists in 1850. These two most prominent
national leaders with powerful Kentucky affiliations were ad-
versaries who differed on methods, but they were comparably
Unionistic in principle. It was Taylor—a man more direct than
Clay, far humbler and less aristocratic in manner, and western
in a sense that Lincoln was western—whose Unionist stand
anticipated the Lincoln stand of 1861. Knowing this, we have
no difficulty in viewing Lincoln as an empathetic Taylor fol-
lower.
It may be thought by some that Lincoln's birth and infancy
in Kentucky had little or no effect on most of his life. True, he
left Kentucky as a lad—growing to manhood in Indiana and
thence heading west to Illinois. Is it, then, mere sentimen-
talism or antiquarianism to relate Lincoln to Kentucky? Quite
the contrary. Kentucky individuals and Kentucky influences
never left Lincoln no matter where he was. More con-
sequential than what occurred to him during his seven Ken-
tucky years was the repeated impact of Kentucky associations
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on the man's insight and outlook. Kentucky-type westernness
accompanied Lincoln everywhere, as integral in him as it was
in Taylor.
The third member of our historic trio left Kentucky when
even younger than Lincoln. Yet Jefferson Davis, native of
Fairview, likewise was affected by Kentucky and Kentuckians
for the duration of his days. At the very age when Lincoln
moved to Indiana, Davis was sent back to Kentucky from
Mississippi to attend school in Washington County. There he
remained a year and a half. He later spent a similar period as a
college boy at Transylvania. When he was a young man his
sweetheart—who became his wife in a Kentucky ceremony—
was the daughter of Zachary Taylor. Like Taylor and Lincoln,
Davis knew hundreds of Kentuckians from childhood and
adolescence on. Davis visited Kentucky a number of times
and came back to his birthplace in old age. Notwithstanding
all these Kentucky relationships, the president of the Confed-
erate States would be the leading exponent—in action—of
a concept of Union diametrically different from the one in
which Taylor and Lincoln believed.
A searing tragedy in Davis's life—one deeply grieving
Taylor, too—will be presented in the second chapter. Though
its total effect on the younger man probably never will be
known, it certainly led to Davis's becoming far more of a
reader and student than he had ever been before. After eight
years of Mississippi isolation, when he set aside social di-
versions for scholarly nights and pensive days, Davis emerged
intellectually reborn. Within a short time he was recognized as
a foremost interpreter of Deep South, not Kentucky or
nationalistic, sentiment. And the essence of his Union-
secession rationale is set forth near the end of the book.
1ABRAHAM LINCOLN
BEFORE HIS PRESIDENCY
'HILE Ohio, Virginia, New York, and a few other states
have been closely linked to several White House occupants,
most commonwealths have lacked anything more than inci-
dental personal associations with our chief executives. In con-
trast, one of Kentucky's unique features is found in her inti-
mate identification with two presidents of the United States
and the sole president of the Confederacy. Abraham Lincoln
and Jefferson Davis not only were born in Kentucky but had a
number of Kentucky ties lasting many years. Zachary Taylor,
who won the admiration of both Davis and Lincoln, grew to
manhood in Kentucky and there spent over half his life.
Moreover, the same pervasive issues—the federal Union's
nature and future and the questions of slavery and slavery's
extension—proved to be prominent in the civil careers of all
three men.
On February 12, 1809, Lincoln was born in a log cabin in
that portion of Hardin County which subsequently became
Larue. He spent seven years in the Bluegrass state before
accompanying his father, mother, and older sister to Indiana
in 1816.
Although he lived much longer in Indiana and Illinois than
in Kentucky, the Lincoln of adolescence and maturity was
importantly influenced by people from his native state. Lin-
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coin's parents, stepmother, wife, teachers, three law partners,
and closest friend.all were persons identified with Kentucky.
His beau ideal of political leadership during much of Lincoln's
career was the Whig champion and five-time presidential can-
didate, Kentucky's Henry Clay. When the Civil War came
Lincoln was so conscious of Kentucky's importance to the
Union that he said he hoped God would be on his side but he
must have Kentucky.
The log cabin had become a widely recognized campaign
symbol in 1840, two decades prior to Lincoln's first election,
when William Henry Harrison ran as the first successful Whig
presidential aspirant. Harrison, however, was really an aristo-
crat reared in a mansion near Virginia's James River and later
occupying other fine houses at Vincennes in Indiana Territory
and at North Bend in Ohio. Voters of 1860, on the other hand,
knew there was nothing fictitious about a Kentucky cabin as
Lincoln's birthplace and erstwhile home. Thus fellow parti-
sans' presentation of Lincoln as a man of the people, who had
been an infant and a child of the frontier, had a truthful ring
when Honest Abe emerged as a nominee.
One facet of Lincoln's background was thoroughly mis-
understood by historians and other writers until the second
quarter of the twentieth century. For a long time it was widely
believed that his father, Thomas Lincoln, was a Kentucky
ne'er-do-well. Seeming substantiation of this "fact" came from
the last of Lincoln's law partners, William H. Herndon. Some
people even went so far as to assert that Lincoln's father was
somebody else—making the sixteenth president illegitimate.
(This idea fitted in with classical tales about the multiple gods
of antiquity worshiped in Greece and Rome, who descended
from the skies and impregnated earth-dwelling women. How
else to account for the greatness of "the farmer's son" or "the
carpenter's son"?) No fewer than fourteen prominent males,
including George Washington—who died more than eight
years before Lincoln was conceived—and John C. Calhoun,
were brought forward as putative Lincoln sires. The whole
argument, of course, was ridiculous. Still, accounts of that sort
appeared in numerous books and articles. And even persons
disinclined to swallow the absurdity looked down upon
Thomas Lincoln as a mudsill of society.
It was not until the 1930s that re-creations of the real
Thomas Lincoln came to be widely accepted. The change was
due to a belated discovery that, judged by pioneer standards,
Thomas had met with successes as well as failures in his Ken-
tucky milieu. The proof appeared in the account books of
Bleakley & Montgomery, proprietors of a general store in the
Kentucky village of Elizabethtown. These ledgers provided
evidence that, before his marriage to Nancy Hanks, Thomas
Lincoln had a substantial sum of money on deposit.
On their pages are delineated, in housekeeping and clothing
purchases, some of a bridegroom-to-be's preparations to be-
come a family man. They demonstrate beyond a doubt that, in
the first decade of the nineteenth century, Thomas was far
from being a wastrel. Later he did have hard luck. Like Daniel
Boone, he was victimized by faulty Kentucky land titles—a
source of trouble for many Kentucky settlers besides the Lin-
colns and the Boones. In Indiana, where he attempted a fresh
start, Thomas never fared so well as he had in Kentucky. He
was, however, a skillful carpenter (his corner cupboards today
having astronomical valuations) and he did put bread on the
table. While in no sense approximating his son's intellectual or
leadership abilities, Thomas minimally was a respectable per-
son. From this paternal Kentuckian the youthful Abe un-
doubtedly heard much about Kentucky people, Kentucky
land, and aspects of Kentucky law.
Nancy Hanks Lincoln, the president's mother, died in In-
diana when her son was only nine. Like Thomas, she had
long lived in Kentucky—as had Sarah Bush Johnston, the
Elizabethtown widow who became Thomas's second wife.
Young Lincoln and his stepmother got along well, which
suggests give-and-take in their natures and also similar stan-
dards and interests. There are hints and more than hints that it
was Sarah, as much as anyone else, who encouraged her step-
son to read for pleasure and self-improvement and to study the
grammar, mathematics, literature, and history which consti-
tuted the bases of his education. We know that he was de-
voted to her, just as he had been to his own mother. In early
1861 it was the Widow Lincoln he went to see on a special
journey shortly before leaving Illinois to shoulder his presi-
dential burdens.
Yet another Kentucky woman proved equally influential,
and maybe more so, in a strikingly different way. Mary Ann
Todd had grown up in Kentucky's principal cultural center as
the daughter of a leading banker. Of excellent repute in
financial circles, Robert Smith Todd was socially prominent in
Lexington and a friend of Henry Clay. Young Miss Todd's
family gave her advantages her future husband never had. Her
formal education was far superior to his. As she was also bright
and attractive, it was no surprise that—when she traveled
west to visit her sisters in Illinois—she quickly became a
Springfield belle.
Much controversy has clustered about the personality and
character of Mary Todd Lincoln. In great measure this derives
from the testimony of Herndon, who disliked Mary and was
held in low esteem by her. The Mrs. Lincoln depicted by
Herndon was arrogant, pompous, hopelessly neurotic, a nag-
ger, and a spur. As Herndon would have it, she made life at
the Lincolns' Springfield home so unpleasant as to cause Abra-
ham to escape as frequently as possible—seeking relief in
his law office or out on the circuit trying cases.
Enough may be learned from independent sources about
the White House period when she was the first lady to indicate
that Mary could indeed present problems stemming from
emotionalism and extravagance. Still, on at least three counts a
strong case can be made that she was far more an asset than a
liability to Lincoln's career as a whole.
One of Mary's three main contributions had to do with her
upbringing and family relationships. Reared amid social
niceties, she was on intimate terms with the Ninian Edward-
ses (her brother-in-law and sister) and other influential
Springfield people. She likewise maintained familial and other
contacts in Lexington. Thus, to a great extent because of her,
Lincoln was enabled to move in Illinois and Kentucky social
circles that contrasted with the circumscribed ones of his
youth.
Probably more consequential was the fact that this faithful
wife and mother of four sons was intellectually capable of
understanding public questions, sizing up public men, and
discussing both intelligently with her husband. While evi-
dence on this score is fragmentary, it seems that her role along
such lines was more meaningful in Springfield than in
Washington. (The point of their marriage at which she became
most emotional and obviously neurotic followed the death of
the Lincolns' most promising child, eleven-year-old Willie,
during the Civil War. Nothing could be more understandable
than a shattered mother's reaction to such a tragedy.)
Finally, Mary was a spur. Herndon, who appeared intent on
denigrating her as egregiously as he did her father-in-law,
could not have been more correct about her spurring. Ever
ambitious, she early envisioned great things for Lincoln and
no doubt aided him by goading him instead of always purvey-
ing sweetness and light. On all three counts, therefore, it must
be concluded that—regardless of her flaws—Mary's relation-
ship to Abraham's advancement tallies out as a strong plus.
If it has often been the fashion to misinterpret his wife's
role, even more writers have been misled into simplistic views
of Lincoln's prepresidential career. Skimming along the sur-
face, it is easy to point out that he alone among all presidents
never served in any of the following capacities—vice
president, cabinet member, general, governor, senator, or
longtime member of the House of Representatives. Looking
at that long list, any superficial observer must find it tempting
to aver that Lincoln was a political accident. How else to ex-
plain the truth that previous to 1860 he never mounted a
single rung of the traditional ladder?
Approximately half the answer is available in compre-
hending the Illinois of Lincoln's day. It was a predominately
Democratic state which never elected either a Whig governor
or a Whig member of the Senate. Thus Lincoln was not the
only Illinois Whig politician lacking high office in the course of
his Whig years. From the Whig party's birth in the 1830s until
its death throes in the 1850s, Illinois was relatively thinly
populated, especially in its northern counties, and was not
regarded as pivotal; hence no Illinois resident was named to
any presidential cabinet. Lincoln did serve one term in the
House, and so the question may be asked: "Why was he not
renominated?" The answer is that, according to the custom in
his district, the House nomination was passed around. Lincoln
had a single shot at the office, and so did several other persons
who subscribed to this gentlemen's agreement.
Looked at from a second point of view, however, Lincoln's
abilities were indeed recognized—over and over—before
1860. He won election five times to the General Assembly. He
was a presidential elector. He was the sole Illinois Whig in the
Thirtieth Congress. In 1855 he was the Whigs' choice for
United States senator; as neither he nor any other Whig could
be elected, he threw his support to an Anti-Nebraska Demo-
crat who then beat the regular Democratic candidate. In 1856
Lincoln was the runner-up for the Republican vice-
presidential nomination at that party's first national conven-
tion. As a result of his spectacular 1858 canvass for the
senatorship against Stephen A. Douglas, the Republican vote
surpassed the Democratic vote. (Despite this, Lincoln lost to
Douglas in the General Assembly because of the party lineup
there.)
Then the tide turned. The northern counties of Illinois be-
came more heavily populated, with numerous newcomers
hailing from the East and opposing the extension of slavery.
Many people thought the 1860 election would be decided in
the newly pivotal Northwest, Illinois being a key to the out-
come. Thus, nationally, it was now unquestionably an asset to
be an Illinois Republican leader. According to the judgment of
large numbers of Republicans, Lincoln had demonstrated
eloquence and logic in the course of his joint debates with
Douglas. Both geographically and ideologically, Lincoln at
length was considered a remarkably "available" presidential
prospect. Moreover, partly because he had never held a high
political station, he did not have the handicap of old enmities
which damaged rivals' claims.
The element of chance came into the picture with the Re-
publicans' decision to do their nominating in Chicago. With
the galleries full to overflowing with Illinoisans, the rafters
reverberated cries of "Lincoln! Lincoln!" at the convention in
the Wigwam. But let it be noted that it was Lincoln—not
some other Illinois citizen—whom Republicans of the Prairie
State endorsed. This enthusiasm for him resulted from the
impression he had made and the reputation he had built dur-
ing years of Whig-Republican frustrations. He was ready
when the times were ready. Lincoln's reputation—first lim-
ited to his district, then statewide, and now extending beyond
the borders of Illinois—reflected the confidence he inspired
at the bar and on the stump in his policy expressions.
The melancholy side of Lincoln, not yet widely known, had
no part in his 1860 image. But the humor, the whimsy, the
drollery of the man had long been recognized in Illinois and
now won appreciation elsewhere. When asked to prepare an
autobiographical sketch, he described his education as "de-
fective" and concluded a second statement with a pungent
expression—"No other marks or brands recollected." Here
was a politician without pomposity—a statesman with no
suggestion of egoism. A simple man he seemed, one whose
steady progress from humble beginnings to the threshold of
eminence induced no semblance of conceit. Much has been
written about Lincoln as the prototype of the self-made man,
and this facet of his image had great appeal to voters who
themselves either were or aspired to be self-made men. But
here was an unusual sample of the breed—one whose self-
deprecatory tone did not scale down his essential dignity—an
exemplar of the American success story who continued to be
humble and human.
It would be an error to say that either the personality or the
character of Lincoln could not have been precisely what it was
if he had had no Kentucky background. Yet it is my observa-
tion that, as late as the 1970s, certain qualities definitely in-
eluding the humble and self-deprecatory are characteristic of
many Kentuckians. Numerous Kentucky teachers I have
known tend to downplay their knowledge, even when mastery
of their subjects becomes evident in ensuing dialogue. Nor do
teachers monopolize this trait; men and women in other walks
of life are extremely modest in their turn. Wit and humor—so
soft, so deft—often appear second nature to them. Reared by
Kentuckians, associating with Kentuckians throughout his
years of advancement, Lincoln was quintessentially Kentuck-
ian in poking fun—nearly always without barbs—and in illus-
trating politics and so much else with extraordinary anecdotal
ease.
Few Kentuckians voted for Lincoln. A state where slavery
remained legal, Kentucky held fast to the compromise position
which had been exemplified by Henry Clay. Neither Lincoln
nor Douglas nor John C. Breckinridge, the Lexingtonian who
waved aloft the banner of the Democracy's southern wing,
managed to carry the commonwealth. Kentucky's 1860 elec-
tors cast their ballots for John Bell, a Tennessean who bore the
standard of the Constitutional Union party. In 1864 Kentucky
opposed Lincoln a second time—supporting the Democrat
George B. McClellan. There was a very wide streak, pre-
dominant one may argue, of Unionism in Kentucky. Yet many
Republicans' concepts of Unionism in 1860 and also 1864 were
far different from the typical Kentuckians views.
Such facts certainly should not obscure Lincoln's keen
interest in the Kentucky scene in the course of his Civil War
days. He kept in touch with Louisville's Joshua Speed, the old
Kentucky friend of his Illinois years, and with other Kentucky
Unionists. Although John C. Breckinridge cast his lot with the
Confederacy as a major-general and secretary of war, his un-
cle, Robert J. Breckinridge, became the temporary chairman
of the national convention that renominated Lincoln. And
James Speed, Joshua's brother, would ultimately serve as Lin-
coln's attorney general.
If Lincoln at the outset lacked military experience except
for a foray in the Black Hawk War, from the first he clearly
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comprehended Kentucky's strategic importance. In 1861 the
president said that "to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to
lose the whole game." It is conceivable that Kentucky would
have performed approximately as she did without a
Kentucky-minded man in the White House. Nevertheless,
what did occur with specific regard to Kentucky eventuated
much as the prescient Lincoln had hoped and planned.
JEFFERSON DAVIS
BEFORE HIS PRESIDENCY
IN EVALUATING the life of Jefferson Davis, one finds an almost
equal number of similarities and dissimilarities with Lincoln's
record. A surface evaluation, of course, points to more of the
latter than the former. That part of the Davis career with
which most people are familiar presents him as a Deep South
Democrat, a cotton planter and slave owner, who typified se-
cessionist sentiment and for four years headed the Confeder-
ate government. Moreover, some authors have seen Davis as a
none too efficient executive who made many procedural mis-
takes. Almost invariably, he has been depicted as a cold per-
son, with ice water in his veins—contrasting so totally with the
warm and human Lincoln that Robert E. Lee, rather than
Davis, looms as the favorite candidate for heroic stature in the
Confederacy.
There have been far fewer scholarly studies of Davis than of
Lincoln. Much less effort has been expended to understand
the man behind the facade, and this is particularly true with
respect to the antebellum decades. It is as vital to study the
young Davis and the Davis of middle life as to study the Lin-
coln of the same developmental stages. Who was Jefferson
Davis? What antecedents, youthful experiences, problems,
disappointments, and successes marked or marred Davis's
progress? In more than one regard the story is fascinating.
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Davis's birth took place in Todd (then Christian) County,
Kentucky, on June 3, 1808. The youngest of ten children, he
was the son of Samuel and Jane Cook Davis, who, while not
rich, were much more prosperous than Thomas and Nancy
Lincoln. Though doing fairly well economically in the Blue-
grass state, Samuel decided to move south before the baby was
two years old. At first the family went to Saint Mary's Parish,
Louisiana, and then to Wilkinson County, Mississippi, for
what were hoped to be brighter financial prospects.
It was in Mississippi near Woodville that little Jeff first went
to school under conditions not much better than little Abe's in
Indiana. Displeased with his son's rudimentary education,
Samuel decided to send him back to Kentucky for better op-
portunities. Leaving home when only seven years old, the boy
was enrolled for a year and a half at a Roman Catholic insti-
tution—the College of St. Thomas Acquin in Washington
County, Kentucky. Next came a brief period at what was
called Jefferson College in Adams County, Mississippi, fol-
lowed by four years at the Wilkinson County Academy near
his father's home. Then, when Jeff was fourteen, he again
found himself a Kentucky student, this time at Transylvania
University.
Located at Lexington, Transylvania at the time was an out-
standing institution of higher learning—approximate in
quality to Harvard and Yale—and one of the best in the
United States. Davis stayed there a year and a half (not the
three years of tradition), rooming and boarding at the post-
master's house several blocks from the home of little Mary
Ann Todd. He enjoyed the Lexington experience, but left in
1824 at the age of sixteen to enter the United States Military
Academy. At West Point as at Transylvania, he met and min-
gled with many future leaders. Graduating from the academy
in 1828, he became a second lieutenant in the army—all of his
assignments as a subaltern being limited to the western
frontier.
The picture of Davis at Transylvania and West Point is most
revealing of his character and overall performance. His natural
inclinations directed him toward humanities and social sci-
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ences, not mathematics or engineering. This preference no
doubt explains, to an appreciable degree, his rather low stand-
ing in his class—twenty-third out of thirty-three members—
at West Point, where engineering was emphasized. But that
explanation is not total. What we know of his West Point rec-
ord strongly suggests that he was a fun-lover, participating in
scrapes, picking up demerits, and barely avoiding expulsion.
Here we have a preview of the hot-blooded junior officer's
later involvement in occasional escapades and personality
showdowns with his superiors. Fun-loving is not the only apt
adjective. Spirited, too, tells part of the story.
The most important event affecting Davis during his duty
tours in the West occurred in 1832-33 at Fort Crawford in
what now is Wisconsin. There, at Prairie du Chien, he fell
head over heels in love with a charming girl named Sarah
Knox Taylor. He was twenty-three, she eighteen, when their
romance blossomed. The future president, Zachary Taylor,
was the young lady's father and the post's commandant.
Member of a notable Kentucky family, "Knox"—as she
was known to relatives and friends—saw nothing but good in
her handsome suitor. Not so Colonel Taylor, who had at least
two objections to the matrimonial hopes of Jeff and Knox. Be-
cause Mrs. Taylor had undergone multiple privations at iso-
lated forts, the colonel sternly opposed his daughters' marry-
ing army officers. Understandably, he wanted them to enjoy
tranquility in civilization and to avoid sacrifices like their
mother's. In addition, Taylor had reservations about Davis on
personal grounds. One account holds that, when sitting on a
court martial, Davis voted with Major Thomas Smith in oppo-
sition to Taylor. "No man who votes with Tom Smith shall
marry my daughter!" the irate senior officer is said to have
exclaimed. Another version contends that one evening Lieu-
tenant Jeff had danced with an Indian maiden in a manner
offensive in Taylor's eyes. Whatever the reasons for his dis-
pleasure, Zachary emphatically declared that he would not
approve the Taylor-Davis match.
For the next two and a half years the young people bided
their time until Knox reached her twenty-first birthday.
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Meanwhile, Davis obtained a transfer to what is now Okla-
homa, where the hotheadedness he had demonstrated at West
Point again surfaced at Fort Gibson; and Knox left Prairie du
Chien to visit kin in the Louisville area. In the spring of 1835
her fiance resigned from the army—presumably to cancel that
phase of Taylor's objections. And, although her parents still
disapproved, the twenty-one-year-old Knox made her wed-
ding plans with their full knowledge.
In various corners of the United States there are traditions
that Miss Taylor eloped with Davis—from no fewer than
seven communities. She did nothing of the sort. In June 1835
they became man and wife in a Jefferson County, Kentucky,
ceremony attended by Knox's older sister and by many cousins
in the house of her paternal aunt. Her father's older brother
gave her in marriage. Mythmakers have it that she climbed
out a window into the waiting arms of Davis. One wonders if it
is supposed to follow that the uncle, aunt, sister, and cousins
also acrobatically emerged from the window, or whether,
being rational people, all those Taylors walked through door-
ways.
Terrible tragedy ensued. Bride and groom boarded a river
packet at Louisville, the ex-lieutenant escorting the girl of his
dreams to what he imagined would be an idyllic existence on a
Mississippi cotton plantation. Before settling down, however,
they would visit some of the Davis relatives whom Knox had
never met. Thus in the late summer they were guests of Jef-
ferson's eldest sister near Saint Francisville, Louisiana, where
both newlyweds contracted malarial fever. "The country is
quite healthy," Knox had assured her parents in an August
letter. Alas, it was not so. The lovers had been married exactly
three months when, on September 15, 1835, the bride died in
the groom's arms at his sister's house in West Feliciana Parish.
Never was a widower more crushed or drained by bereave-
ment than Jefferson Davis. He sailed to Cuba to regain his
health and traveled to Washington and New York for a change
of scene. But, aside from those excursions, he remained a
recluse on his plantation named Brierfield for eight sorrowful
years. Seeing virtually no one but his slaves and his brother
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Joseph, he worked out a patriarchal system for the blacks he
owned. Of immense significance is the fact that, for the first
time in his life, he became an extremely diligent student. Im-
mersing himself in books on government, history, and world
literature, the once lighthearted and none-too-scholarly cadet
and lieutenant reeducated himself from his twenty-seventh to
his thirty-fifth year.
While attempting to assuage his grief by turning to in-
tellectual interests, the still relatively young man benefited
from the aid and devotion of an able brother. Twenty-three
years Jefferson's senior, Joseph Emory Davis had become a
second father to his youngest sibling after their sire Samuel's
death. A veteran of the battle of New Orleans and very
successful as a lawyer-planter, Joseph had a major role in
Jefferson's attending West Point. Joseph, too, had a decided
political orientation. And in their libraries the two men de-
veloped their mutual interests in endless discussions concern-
ing political theory and practice. Congenial they were, and, in
addition, Jefferson benefited from the generosity of Joseph.
For the latter was Jefferson's financial angel.
At last, in the mid-1840s, the anchorite of Brierfield aban-
doned seclusion in favor of public and normal private life. Var-
ina Howell, the beautiful Natchez brunette who became his
second wife in 1845, acknowledged that the face and form of
"the sainted Sarah" were never erased from his memory. Still,
after the long hiatus, Jefferson was ready for a new love and a
new career. A Democrat like Joseph, he lost his first political
contest when he ran for the legislature in a Whig district. But
when he made a race for Congress it was another story. And in
late 1845, with the nineteen-year-old Varina accompanying
him, he went to Washington as a member of the Mississippi
delegation in the House of Representatives.
The Mexican War interrupted Davis's service on Capitol
Hill. Chosen to command a regiment of Mississippi volun-
teers, he fought with gallantry under Zachary Taylor in the
bloody battle of Monterrey. Wounded in the foot at Buena
Vista, where he performed an epic exploit that helped bring
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victory to Taylor's troops, Davis was visited in his tent that
night by his former father-in-law. I was told by Sarah Knox
Davis's niece that the general then said to the colonel, "My
daughter was a better judge of men than I was."
Returning home a hero to convalesce, Davis was offered a
brigadier-generalship. Declining the honor, he subsequently
accepted appointment to a Senate vacancy. Shortly afterwards
he won election to the same seat, and in the dramatic crisis of
1850 he succeeded Calhoun as the recognized leader of the
southern anticompromise forces. Davis suffered a political
setback when in 1851, entering the campaign late to supplant a
weaker candidate, he was narrowly defeated for Mississippi's
governorship. There followed four years as head of the War
Department in Washington, where he made a fine record, and
then again his state sent him to the Senate, where he stayed
until January 1861.
Contrasts between Davis and Lincoln in the pre-Civil War
era include the southerner's far greater prominence, not only
in holding offices but in distinguishing himself as an incum-
bent. Davis was a senator, which Lincoln was not; a cabinet
officer, which Lincoln never became; and a national figure in
the very period when the Illinoisan seemed a failure in poli-
tics. From Joseph, Davis obtained economic advantages—in
contrast with Lincoln's unaided self-advancement. While Lin-
coln as a young man had been elected captain of his Black
Hawk War company, this achievement paled alongside the
glamour of Davis's merit in Mexico. The mantle of Calhoun
appeared to fit the Mississippian better than any other resi-
dent of his region, whereas not until later did Lincoln qualify
as the principal exponent of the Websterian tradition.
But if Davis's progress long went unmatched in Lincoln's
career, there were similarities as well. Lincoln was defeated
once, Davis twice, in popular elections. Both men had lived
on the frontier and near frontier of the then Northwest. Both
were identified with the Black Hawk War. Both were chosen a
single time to represent their House districts in Washington.
Each was a presidential elector. Each became the most re-
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spected leader in the party of his choice in the state where he
made his home, a fact obscured in Lincoln's case by the
circumstances previously discussed. This stature was obvious
prior to the critical year of 1860, when Lincoln loomed as II-
linois's premier Republican just as Davis continued to be
recognized as Mississippi's outstanding Democrat.
In their personal lives dissimilarities and similarities are
equally easy to recount. Born in Kentucky less than a hun-
dred miles apart, and both leaving Kentucky as little boys,
each was influenced—educationally and otherwise—by a
whole host of Kentuckians. At a considerable distance from
Kentucky each fell in love with, and paid court to, an appeal-
ing representative of a leading Kentucky family. Each married
a Kentuckian. Each returned to Kentucky—Davis to attend
the school of the Dominican friars and college at Transylvania,
as well as to wed Knox Taylor; Lincoln to visit Joshua Speed at
charming Farmington on the edge of Louisville, and to be a
guest of Mary's father and stepmother at the Todd residence
on Main Street in Lexington.
Viewed simplistically, the educations of the two men were
as different as could be. The young Lincoln of backwoods
Spencer County, Indiana, had a total of one year's formal
schooling. And yet the adolescent Abraham, studying on his
own by firelight in his father's log house, as if by a miracle
managed to compensate. For, when he crossed the Wabash
River at Vincennes into Illinois at the age of twenty-one, he
could write well and speak well, and already he possessed
leadership qualities, as within two years his peers elected him
to be their company commander.
At primary and secondary as well as higher levels, from the
College of St. Thomas Acquin and the Wilkinson County
Academy to Transylvania and West Point, the young Davis
was exposed to excellent and sustained classroom instruction
which Lincoln never experienced. But what really mattered
was that, as mature men, both Davis and Lincoln for years
educated themselves. Lincoln, like George Washington,
trained and worked as a surveyor. Then he studied law, was
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admitted to the bar, and became one of Illinois's most skillful
attorneys—mastering the six books of Euclid along the way.
With Davis's eight years of reading, studying, and thinking we
have become acquainted. Rarely if ever have two opposite
figures in a great national struggle devoted lengthier spans of
time in their thirties and late twenties to study and serious
thought.
The aggregate influence of love and marriage on the lives of
both Lincoln and Davis was tremendous. In all American an-
nals, there is no example clearer than the Davis one of a
widower's intellectual growth burgeoning from the dark valley
of grief. Moreover, if Davis's courtship of Knox Taylor was
complicated by the intransigence of the girl's father, smooth
sailing and sunny skies proved equally elusive for a time in the
Todd-Lincoln romance—but for different reasons. Lincoln
long was simply not sure of himself. He and his friend Speed
admitted to each other that they were fearful of "nervous
debility" where matrimony was concerned. On one occasion
Abraham even broke his engagement to Mary. Then Speed's
ultimately becoming a happy husband did much to reduce
Lincoln's lingering doubts, which eventually dissolved when
he and Mary wed.
The similarities between Varina Davis and Mary Lincoln
were many and striking. One of the most learned and beloved
men in the Natchez area was Judge George Winchester,
whom Miss Howell called Great Heart. Much of her educa-
tion was turned over to him by Varina's parents, who were
among his admirers. At a girls' school in Philadelphia, but
mainly under Winchester's direction, she made the most of
opportunities to increase her information and sharpen her
intellect—meanwhile becoming unusually attractive. Her
schooling mirrored the same sorts of standards as Mary Ann
Todd's under Lexington's Dr. John Ward and Madame Men-
telle.
Like Mary, Varina unquestionably was strong willed. As
early as her twentieth year, this quality manifested itself when
she aggressively opposed Congressman Jeffs decision to re-
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sign his seat in the House, leave his young wife, and go off to
war. Indeed, Davis failed to convince her that a West Pointer's
logical station in time of war was the battlefield. Although she
lost that debate when he joined the colors, her powerful will
asserted itself in after times. Like Mary, Varina was deeply
devoted not only to her husband personally but to enhancing
his political assets. She bore six children. And when her little
boy Joseph died in the executive mansion at Richmond, she
suffered just as Mary suffered when Willie Lincoln was taken
from her. It is a curious coincidence that each presidential
household lost its brightest and most promising child while
other mothers' sons were slaughtering one another in the mili-
tary frightfulness of the Brothers' War.
Before her birth, Varina's family had gone to Mississippi
from the northern part of the United States—her father hail-
ing from New Jersey, where his father had served as governor.
Many of Varina's kinsmen remained in the North, just as vari-
ous Todd relatives and in-laws lived in the South and were
identified with the Confederacy, some bearing arms against
the Union. So both first ladies came to be criticized with the
utmost severity and, in the main, unfairly. Faultfinders as-
sailed Mary for sympathizing with the southern cause; and
Varina, with the northern cause. Both wives were high strung,
mercurial, and given to outbursts, which in no sense lightened
their husbands' burdens. When the Civil War was over, both
women broke down, tragic victims of nervous disorders, and
both sought recovery in Europe. After a series of well-nigh
incredible vicissitudes Varina's restitution was complete;
Mary's, only partial.
If Lincoln's and Davis's lives had been placid, if for them
true love's course had always been smooth, if their attitudes
toward self-education had been different, if they had never
tasted failure and all goals had been attained, one wonders
whether their characters would have been as firm as history
knows them to have been. No scholar ever has had access to,
or ever will possess, all the materials essential to a precise
answer to that question. Yet what is certain from the foregoing
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is that the progression of these two men, from the Kentucky of
1808 and 1809 to the 1861 presidencies of the Confederacy
and the United States, was extraordinary.
Their determination to improve themselves, their triumphs
over odds, and the vigor with which they did what was needed
to attain distinction in a democratic society—all these





IN POLITICAL ideologies, party affiliations, and partisanship
itself, Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis had almost wholly
contrasting opinions and allegiances. One of their few points
of agreement (and it was not identical in every respect) con-
cerned Kentucky's other president—Zachary Taylor of Jeffer-
son County.
Unlike them, Taylor was not a Kentucky native. But he
lived in Kentucky for a far longer period than either of the
younger men. Born in Orange County, Virginia, on November
24, 1784, little Zack was brought out west—accompanying his
parents and two older brothers—to the Louisville environs
when he was eight months old. He literally grew up with what
became the Union's fifteenth state in 1792, seven years after
his arrival. There still were Indians in Kentucky in those days.
Dangerous bands of red men from across the Ohio River
lurked around the log house where the youngster lived. It took
time for the comparatively few white men of the area, aided
by the blacks they had brought with them, to transform the
wilderness into farmland and to build brick houses for their
families and themselves. Lads learned to work when they
were small. And, while Zack recited his letters and numbers to
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two schoolmasters intermittently during his boyhood, the in-
cessant demands of farm and frontier life gave low priority to
book learning.
Their primitive surroundings should not disguise the fact
that, both before and after they reached the Falls of the Ohio,
the Kentucky Taylors and their relations were people of
ability. Back in the early colonial days their forebears had been
leaders. Elder William Brewster of Mayflower renown was
one of Zachary's direct ancestors. James Madison, who in 1787
wrote much of the American Constitution, was the Kentucky
child's second cousin. And included among his future kinsmen
would be Robert E. Lee and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Lieuten-
ant Colonel Richard Taylor, young Zack's father, served cred-
itably throughout the Revolutionary War. In the course of
that struggle, he took time out to marry a Virginia girl of gen-
tle breeding—Sarah Dabney Strother—who gave birth to her
last six children in Kentucky, thus increasing her brood to
a total of nine.
Nothing was more characteristic of Taylors and Taylor de-
scendants than adherence to a military tradition. Zachary's
son, grandsons, and great-grandsons were to prove themselves
resourceful and valorous soldiers and sailors. One of his great-
grandsons would become military governor of the Yukon, and
a great-great-grandson was the longtime head of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police.
Colonel Dick's land in Jefferson County came to him as a
grant in recognition of his services in the Revolution. Near
him lived a number of fellow veterans, including Richard
Clough Anderson (whose son Robert would defend Fort Sum-
ter in 1861). Nearby, too, at Locust Grove resided Colonel and
Mrs. William Croghan, whose son George would save Fort
Stephenson in the War of 1812. And a frequent house guest of
these Taylor friends was General George Rogers Clark, the
famous victor of Vincennes, who was Mrs. Croghan's brother
and George Croghan's uncle.
It is scarcely a surprise to learn that, reared in such an
environment, Zachary and all four of his brothers who reached
maturity became identified with the army for long or short
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periods. Zachary himself received a commission as first lieu-
tenant of infantry in the spring of 1808 at the age of twenty-
three. A captain in 1812, he successfully defended Fort Harri-
son on the Wabash. The first American land victory during our
second conflict with Britain, this accomplishment won him the
brevet of major.
The next armed encounter turned out to be less glamorous,
for in 1814 at Credit Island in the Mississippi River, Major
Taylor was overmatched by superior British and Indian fire-
power, and he retreated for the only time in his life. A third
combat opportunity came in 1832 in the course of the Black
Hawk campaign, when as a colonel he took part in the battle of
the Bad Axe. Five years later, on Christmas Day, he com-
manded United States regulars and Missouri volunteers in the
Florida battle of Okeechobee. For routing the Seminole and
Mikasuki Indians in that fiercely fought engagement, Taylor
became a brevet brigadier-general, which was his grade when
the Mexican War began.
If these may be regarded as moments of drama in a long
career, it should be recalled that most of Taylor's service oc-
curred in periods of tranquility. Possibly his most signal ser-
vice prior to 1846 consisted of guarding pioneer settlements
and maintaining peace with Indian tribes. Except for inter-
ludes of recruiting responsibility, he never had a cushy job.
Yet as often as possible he came back to Kentucky when duty
and periodic leaves permitted.
In Kentucky in 1810, Taylor married Margaret Mackall
Smith of Maryland. In Kentucky five of their six children were
born. There he farmed in 1815-16 when, for one year, he was
a civilian. There his venerable father and then his brother
Hancock lived at the old Jefferson County place, where
Zachary was always welcome. Taylor owned Kentucky farm-
land for a while. He invested in Louisville town lots and ware-
houses (retaining these until his death), and bought stock in
two Kentucky banks.
Taylor seriously considered resigning from the army in
1821, 1838, 1841, and at other times. He did resign once, in
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1815. Loving the agricultural life, he dreamed of being a full-
time planter. Selling the Kentucky farm at a substantial profit,
in the 1820s he bought a Deep South plantation situated partly
in Wilkinson County, Mississippi, and partly in West
Feliciana Parish, Louisiana. In 1841, Taylor purchased Cy-
press Grove plantation near Rodney, Mississippi. Unlike the
moneymaking ventures preceding it, this investment proved a
failure because of floods and the low price of cotton. Still he
kept it so long as he lived, even when, during his presidency,
he and his son Richard acquired a Louisiana sugar plantation.
As an absentee owner, Taylor entrusted the management of
his planting interests and his slaves to two cousins on his
mothers side of the family—first Damascus Thornton and
then James Thornton. After a long period in Taylor's employ,
James in the 1840s returned to Kentucky to farm on his own.
Then Thomas W. Ringgold became the last of Taylor's over-
seers. Taylor owned 118 slaves the year of his presidential
election. He bought sixty-four more a few weeks before he
died. If his letters to Ringgold are to be taken as criteria,
Taylor was one of the kindest of masters. When an English-
woman and her daughter visited Cypress Grove one winter,
they were shown the interior of one of the slaves' houses,
which they found "extremely nice." The blacks were all "well
fed, comfortably clothed, and kindly cared for." The men wore
flannel trousers, their wives' dresses were made of white
calico, "while almost all had woollen shawls."
Everyone was given milk to drink, a pound of meat on a
daily average, as much bread as was desired, and an abun-
dance of vegetables. Weekly every adult received coffee, but-
ter, and flour for pastry. Taylor was especially insistent that
the vegetable supply be maintained. Sheep should be butch-
ered regularly, he directed, and made into soup for the ser-
vants' meals. He was also outspokenly opposed to exacting toil
from sick field hands, advising that they be permitted to rest
until they were well and strong. "Distribute . . . five hundred
dollars . . . among the servants at Christmas," the manager
was told one November. This should be done "in such a way as
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you think they deserve by their good conduct." Thus the aver-
age black received a five-dollar Christmas gift—the equivalent
of forty dollars or more in 1977.
Benignity also characterized Taylor's treatment of his troops
in Texas and Mexico. His tent flap was open, anyone could
come to see him, and his kindnesses were proverbial. His
magnanimity became evident when, at Matamoros on the Rio
Grande, he ordered American doctors to give careful attention
to wounded Mexicans abandoned by their superiors. Then he
contributed several hundred dollars for the Mexicans' benefit.
Another account depicts him aboard ship in the Gulf en route
home at the war's end. Of course, the best stateroom was as-
signed to the general. But, turning over his quarters to
wounded volunteers, he went to sleep under the sail—his bed
a mattress out on the deck.
Utterly unpretentious, General Taylor rarely wore a uni-
form. Newcomers to his camp failed to recognize him as their
commanding officer. "He looks more like an old farmer going
to market with eggs to sell," declared an Indiana captain.
"How little of the pronoun T about him and all his acts," a
youthful West Pointer from New York exclaimed. When the
state of Louisiana presented Taylor with a handsome sword,
with tears of gratitude he credited his victories
to the gallant officers and brave men whom he had the honor to com-
mand, and reserved to himself only a soldier's share.
What a marked exception to [other] generals on such occasions!
. . . It is this noble modesty that dignifies the general, and attaches
him to all his officers and men. His soldiers will ever love him, and
fight with a devotion that will make up for many deficiencies in sci-
ence on the battlefield.
That Taylor was deficient in military science there cannot be
the slightest doubt. Unlike Davis and Lincoln, he did not use
leisure opportunities in his early adult and middle years to
educate or reeducate himself in anything like a proficient way.
He did show sound sense at Palo Alto in the spring of 1846 by
making the battle an artillery duel, as the Americans were
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vastly superior in that critical arm. The next day, in the hell-
for-Ieather fray at Resaca de la Palma, he assigned cavalrymen
to capture cannon—anticipating British tactics in the fatal
Charge of the Light Brigade, but getting away with the risk
nonetheless. At Monterrey the following September, his di-
vided force's three-day efforts to invest the city failed. Taylor
occupied it only as a result of an unauthorized armistice,
which Washington superiors sharply criticized.
Owing to the Monterrey experience (which was considered
a victory by most Americans), and also perhaps for political
reasons, President James K. Polk lost faith in Taylor. Polk
picked General Winfield Scott to land at Vera Cruz, with
Mexico City Scott's objective, while Taylor was limited to a
holding operation in the Monterrey vicinity. When Taylor
learned that most of his seasoned fighters were being trans-
ferred to the southern column, his wrath was extreme. Gen-
eral Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna got wind of what had hap-
pened and proceeded to attack Taylor's depleted contingents
on the rugged terrain of Buena Vista, where the latter—again
unauthorized—had advanced.
The Buena Vista battle was a nip and tuck affair contested in
February 1847. Santa Anna had twenty thousand soldiers,
Taylor less than one-fourth that number—fewer than five
hundred of them regulars. Taylor has been criticized because
temporarily he left the scene of action, beneath the shadows
of the Sierra Madre, in order to check on his supportive units.
But, present on the field when it really counted and conspicu-
ously mounted on his war horse Old Whitey, he was visible to
friend and foe alike—an inspiration to his men and a target for
enemy shot, which penetrated his overcoat but never nicked
him. Buena Vista was Taylor's most spectacular victory. More
than any other single event, it propelled him to Pennsylvania
Avenue.
His Mexican War triumphs notwithstanding, it is doubtful
that Taylor would have reached the presidency had it not been
for his personal traits. Winfield Scott, decidedly his superior
as a strategist and the winner of more combat tests in Mexico,
never captured the hearts of the American people. Adorned
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with plumes and epaulettes, tall and impressive, whereas
Taylor was short and unimposing, Scott suffered under the
nickname of Old Fuss and Feathers. But Old Rough and
Ready had been Taylor's accolade since his service in the
swamps of Florida. The simplicity, modesty, and humanity of
the sixty-three-year-old border captain at first piqued many
Americans' curiosity and then attracted their admiration. The
more they studied the man they thought they saw, the more
such scrutiny convinced them that no half-hidden flaw sepa-
rated image from reality.
Just as the Mexican War was not popular everywhere in the
United States, there were those—principally Democrats and
northerners—who had reservations about Taylor as a political
figure. The fact that he owned slaves was enough to condemn
him in some northern eyes. He had never voted and never
participated, even momentarily, in civil government. Hence
he had no political record, and this could be construed either
as liability or as asset. As a result of the war, the United States
in 1848 acquired a large southwestern domain, from which the
future states of California, Nevada, Utah, most of Arizona and
New Mexico, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming would be
carved. Should slavery be permitted to expand into some or all
of this huge area? Or should slavery be contained within the
fifteen states where it was legal? For a long time the public did
not know how Taylor stood respecting this issue.
The uncertainty about Taylor's attitude on the principal
question before the country ultimately helped, rather than
hurt, his cause. The Whig party longed for a popular nominee.
None of its leading statesmen ever had won the presidency.
Henry Clay, now over seventy, had vainly sought the office
four times and again held hopes; while some Whigs still
idolized him, others identified him with defeat. Daniel Webs-
ter and fellow Whig senators also had their handicaps. Every
Whig was well aware that the sole triumph of the party had
come under the aegis of General William Henry Harrison,
touted as the hero of Tippecanoe. The basic Whig problem
was to try to transform an electoral minority into a majority.
This spelled the necessity of appealing to independent voters
26
and dissident Democrats, men who might respond with fervor
to a second military nominee.
Taylor's name was first mentioned in connection with the
White House in 1846. Then and the next year and fairly far
into 1848, the letters he wrote in response to volunteer sup-
porters projected rapport with those very elements—in-
dependents and Democrats disenchanted with the Polk re-
gime. Then in April 1848 he declared himself "a Whig but not
an ultra Whig." Thus, identifying himself with the party of the
"outs," he concurrently held onto a substantial number
ofnon-Whig backers. Given the problem which conditions dic-
tated, the Taylor solution was shrewd.
Meanwhile, his backing within Whig ranks had steadily
swelled in both the South and the North. The most effective
part of it stemmed from Kentucky, where Taylor had influen-
tial friends, including Senator John J. Crittenden. The fact
that the Crittenden Whig faction preferred Taylor to Clay in
Clay's own state was a ten-strike for the general. Taylor's ap-
peal in the Deep South naturally was strong on account of his
cotton-planting, slaveholding interests. Some northern Whigs
found his candidacy to their liking because they respected
his army record, admired his personal characteristics, and
thought he had a good chance to win. That magic word avail-
ability worked in his favor through the preconvention jockey-
ing. In June 1848, when Whigs from every part of the land
assembled at Philadelphia, Taylor handily won the Whig
nomination by defeating Clay, Scott, and Webster.
Taylor and his running mate, New York's Millard Fillmore,
opposed Democrats Lewis Cass of Michigan and William O.
Butler of Carrollton, Kentucky. The nominees of both major
parties avoided making definite statements on the burning
issue of slavery extension. Not so a third candidate entering
the contest, ex-President Martin Van Buren, who headed the
Free Soil ticket. Holding their convention at Buffalo in Au-
gust, the Free Soilers explicitly opposed the expansion of
slavery into the soil obtained from Mexico.
Despite his personal popularity, it is possible, and perhaps
probable, that Taylor would have lost the 1848 election if it
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had been restricted to a two-party race. The practical effect of
the Van Buren entry was to split the Democratic vote in New
York, which went to Taylor. Also pivotal was Pennsylvania,
which Taylor carried impressively without indirect Free Soil
aid. Taylor did particularly well in Kentucky, where his mar-
gin topped Clay's 1844 showing. Taylor had majorities or
pluralities in exactly half the states—seven in the North, eight
in the South. As in every presidential sweepstakes after 1840
until 1864, with the exception of 1852, voters as a whole did
not give the victor a popular majority. His measure of triumph
over Cass in the electoral college was 163 to 127.
It is illuminating to note what Davis and Lincoln said and
did concerning Zachary Taylor after the general achieved mili-
tary fame but before he became president-elect. As a leader of
the Democrats in Mississippi, Davis adhered to the tradition
of party regularity, and at the polls he supported Cass. He
made no secret of the fact, however, that he was on very close
personal terms with the father of his first wife. There is frag-
mentary evidence that pro-Taylor Whigs consulted Davis in
Washington prior to the holding of the national conventions.
And in the postconvention campaign Davis maintained the
lowest of partisan profiles.
Earlier the Democratic senator from Mississippi had done
much to impress the public with his high opinion of Old
Rough and Ready. In 1847, Davis wrote that—brilliant as
were Taylor's victories in the war—"those who . . . know . . .
him best will equally . . .  honor him for the purity, the gener-
osity, and . . . magnanimity of his private character. His
colossal greatness is presented in the garb of the strictest
republican simplicity. " In 1848, Davis added that Taylor's life
—"wholly devoted to his country"—had become "a pyramid,"
beautiful in simplicity, sublime in grandeur. Taylor's obelisk,
said Davis, should resemble the Bunker Hill Monument—
"its head amid the clouds,' despising "assaults of. . .creeping
things that crawl around its base." No eulogy of Taylor after
his death would surpass this tribute.
While Lincoln then said nothing of comparable eloquence,
he intimately identified himself with the Taylor candidacy
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both before and after the Whig convention. Throughout the
campaign year, he was a northwestern rarity within an active
congressional group ardently supporting the general. Follow-
ing the Philadelphia nomination, Lincoln toiled for Taylor,
franking hundreds of documents and delivering a pungent
anti-Cass speech on Capitol Hill. Then he campaigned briefly
in Maryland and Delaware and extensively in Massachusetts
and Illinois. As would be expected of one who was both an
original Taylorite and a dedicated Whig, Lincoln cast his ballot
at Springfield for Taylor and carried his enthusiasm over into
the postinauguration months.
As chief executive, Taylor took a strong Unionist position in
the northern Whig meaning of the word Unionist. Sternly op-
posing the compromise ideas of Senators Clay and Douglas,
he offered a "President's Plan," according to which California
and New Mexico would enter the Union as states. Taylor could
have let the matter go at that, without contributing direct or
indirect White House action or influence. Instead, he did ev-
erything in his power to make sure that the people of Califor-
nia and New Mexico would present free-state constitutions
when applying to Congress for admission.
Manifestly, this position was anathema to most southern
Democrats and Whigs alike—and a happy surprise for numer-
ous northerners. Not a few politicians on both sides of the
Mason-Dixon Line were astonished that a man of southern
residence and associations, a planter and a slaveholder, would
do as Taylor did. Had they known that the planter was in the
process of buying another plantation, or that the slave owner
would soon acquire more slaves, their amazement would have
been compounded in learning details of his activities respect-
ing California and New Mexico.
The Whig in the White House developed the President's
Plan even though the Democrats had a majority in the Senate
and a plurality in the House of Representatives. Every north-
ern Whig senator, with two exceptions, supported the Taylor
proposal. So did many northern Whig representatives and a
scattering of other congressmen. There is every indication
that the Compromise of 1850 could never have passed if
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Taylor had lived. Even after his death, it failed to pass with the
Clay stipulations and in the Clay form despite Millard Fill-
more's throwing the weight of presidential prestige and pa-
tronage power on the side of the Clay adherents. Taylor was
president fewer than 500 days. In that brief period, however,
he had a powerful impact on political developments.
The discovery of gold in California, accounts of the treks to
El Dorado, and reports from the Sacramento Valley itself have
concentrated much historical attention on 1848 and 1849. The
year 1850, however, was replete with drama of its own, and
not a few episodes in and out of Washington naturally involved
President Taylor.
The state of Texas claimed what is now the Santa Fe region
of New Mexico. Units of the United States Army were
stationed there under an officer who served as the area's mili-
tary governor. There was a very real danger of a Santa Fe
confrontation between Texas militiamen and the United States
troops. (Texas being a slave state, possession of the disputed
domain was a factor in slavery's extension or containment.)
Taylor made no secret of his resolution to uphold the national
authority if Texas chose to challenge it. Not long before he
died on July 9, 1850, it was understood in Washington that he
planned to strengthen the Santa Fe garrison and that, if civil
war erupted as a result of a southwestern clash, he would per-
sonally take the field against any and all disunionists.
Such determination on the president's part came as no
surprise to observers familiar with the Washington scene.
Taylor's Inaugural Address on March 5, 1849 had been a
rather negative one. But in his State of the Union Message the
following December, he declared that the Union's dissolution
"would be the greatest of calamities. . . .  Upon its preserva-
tion must depend our own happiness and that of countless
generations to come. Whatever dangers may threaten it, I
shall stand by it and maintain it in its integrity to the full extent
of the obligations imposed and the powers conferred upon me
by the Constitution."
In February 1850 at Fredericksburg, Virginia, the president
reemphasized his stand: "As to the Constitution and the Un-
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ion, I have taken an oath to support the one and I cannot do so
without preserving the other, unless I commit perjury, which
I certainly don't intend to do. We must cherish the Consti-
tution to the last. There . . . will be local questions to disturb
our peace; but, after all, we must fall back upon" George
Washington's farewell advice and "preserve the Union at all
hazards. "
Thus the New Mexico part of the crisis should not be viewed
as an isolated episode. In the same month that Taylor spoke in
Virginia, the capital seethed with threats of secession and dis-
ruption. That winter a North Carolina Whig congressman
(who would become a Confederate general) described the
south as ready for disunion. "The breach is widening," a Min-
nesotan feared. The "apprehension . . .  that a separation of
the Union would take place . . . is now universal."
A Kentuckian close to Taylor wrote to Crittenden (now Ken-
tucky's governor) that two senators from the South "produced
quite a panic . . . by declaring that, unless something was very
soon done, events . . . would render a dissolution of the
Union certain." Edward Everett of Massachusetts said:
"There never was a period when the continuance of the Union
seemed to me so precarious." There were fistfights with con-
gressmen as combatants and at least one threatened duel.
Many representatives of the people carried pistols on Capitol
Hill. In April Mississippi's senior senator (not Davis) pointed a
loaded weapon at Missouri's senior senator on the floor of the
historic chamber, while the putative target bared his chest and
cried: "Let the assassin fire!"
To an appreciable degree, 1850 provided a preview of 1861
with respect to presidential attitudes, just as the nullification
winter of 1832-33 had anticipated 1850. There were dif-
ferences between nullification and secession, and indeed Jef-
ferson Davis came to consider them as "antagonistic princi-
ples." Nevertheless, Andrew Jackson's stand on the South
Carolina question nearly eighteen years before bore an unmis-
takable resemblance to Zachary Taylor's in connection with
Texas and New Mexico. Like Taylor, Jackson was a slave-
holder and a southerner. But both also were westerners with
31
tremendous devotion to the nation as a whole. The nonslave-
holding Abraham Lincoln was imbued with Unionist convic-
tions like theirs and, as president, would behave much as they
had. Thus Taylor, in an important sense, was a Jackson-
Lincoln link.
It was a measure of President Taylor's warm personal regard
for Davis that the senator and Varina were treated as members
of the family. In Taylor's time they were in the White House
as constantly as if they had been blood kin. This was true de-
spite the fact that Davis diametrically opposed Taylor's inter-
pretation of the Union and extension issues. "I wish you to
pursue that course," the chief executive wrote Davis (then in
Mississippi) in September 1849, ". . . which your good sense,
interest" and "honor . . . prompt you to do. . . . The family
. . . join me in kindest regards to your better self, your worthy
brother & his most excellent lady as well as yourself. . . .
Wishing you all continued health and prosperity [,] I remain
truly Your Friend Z. TAYLOR."
Albert J. Beveridge was partly responsible for miscon-
ceptions of Taylor's treatment of Abraham Lincoln. In his
Lincoln biography Beveridge wrote that the only appointive
post offered the Illinois Whig by the Taylor administration was
the secretaryship of Oregon Territory. Yet at first he had
the refusal of the General Land Office commissionership, a
prestigious office just below cabinet level. Taylor also offered
him the Oregon governorship, which Lincoln declined. These
were as good positions as went to anyone living west of the
Ohio-Indiana line. Instead of being rated "a failure" (as Bev-
eridge asserted), Lincoln received substantial recognition
from the Whig president he helped nominate and elect.
Lincoln, moreover, delivered as sensitive and accurate an
estimate of Taylor's presidential significance as any contempo-
rary. In his Chicago City Hall eulogy of July 25, 1850, the
lawyer from Springfield said that the presidency "is no bed of
roses." Taylor, like others, "found thorns within it." Still Lin-
coln believed that, "when General Taylors official conduct
shall come to be viewed in the calm light of history," he will
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be found to deserve as little censure "as any who have suc-
ceeded him."
Not "all" patriotism and wisdom had died with Taylor, the
ex-congressman declared, but "wisdom and patriotism . . . are
wholly inefficient and worthless, unless they are sustained by
the confidence and devotion of the people." In Taylor's death,
"we have lost a degree of that confidence. . . . I fear the one
great question of the day is not now so likely to be acquiesced
in by the different sections of the Union, as it would have
been, could General Taylor have been spared to us."
PRESIDENT LINCOLN
a'NE OF THE persons soon to succeed Taylor turned out to
be Lincoln himself. After four years of relative political quies-
cence, Taylor's eulogist was brought back to the alarums and
excursions of public life by the enactment of the Kansas-Ne-
braska Bill. From 1854 he marched—seemingly through a
series of defeats, but in reality from strength to greater
strength. The most colorful of Lincoln's multiple activities of
the 1850s were his joint debates with the "Little Giant" Doug-
las. After their conclusion in the autumn of 1858, he loomed
ever larger as a national figure, a  development which his
Cooper Union speech in early 1860 enhanced. The overriding
issue in both those years was the same as in Taylor's time. It
continued to be compounded of two parts: the extension
or containment of slavery and the nature and future of the
Union.
There has been speculation that, had the Democratic party
remained united, neither Lincoln nor any other Republican
could have won the 1860 election. Such a possibility vanishes
when state-by-state statistics are examined. Lincoln carried
virtually the entire North by clear state majorities, third and
fourth parties having no role like the Free Soilers' in New York
twelve years before. It must be remembered that the Republi-
cans of 1860 did not campaign in favor of slavery's abolition.
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Nor did they advocate civil war. With the exclusion of slavery
from the West as their rallying cry, their posture in this regard
was identical with Zachary Taylor's a decade earlier.
Yet much had happened during that decade to heat north-
erners' and southerners' blood. The Fugitive Slave Law, the
agitation over Kansas, the caning of Charles Sumner, the
Dred Scot decision, and the hanging of John Brown widened
fissures of misunderstanding into chasms too broad to bridge.
Presidents Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, and James
Buchanan—northerners all—became intensely unpopular in
the region whence each had come. Southerners detested the
Republican party, which they correctly considered sectional
and which they feared would trample on states' rights and do
away with slavery everywhere.
There were many statements in 1860 by politicians and
others in the South that, if a Republican should be chosen for
the presidency, southern secession would result. In De-
cember, a month and a half after Lincoln garnered the essen-
tial electors, South Carolina with a flourish led the way out
of the Union. Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and
Louisiana followed in January 1861. Texas on February 1
brought the total to seven. The provisional government of the
Confederate States of America came into being at Mont-
gomery, Alabama, with Jefferson Davis in the presidential
chair. All these developments occurred before Lincoln, on
March 4, supplanted Buchanan in Washington.
Some of Lincoln's fellow Republicans (Charles Francis
Adams of Massachusetts, for example) had serious reser-
vations about him at the outset. Lacking executive experience
and still a stranger to many easterners, he confronted a graver
crisis than had any of his predecessors. William H. Seward of
New York, whom Lincoln named to head the Department of
State, was so dubious of his chief's abilities that within a
month he proposed that he—not Lincoln—should make
major policy decisions. In due course the president demon-
strated that, while he had great respect for Seward, he had not
the slightest intention to abdicate authority.
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Prior to March 4, at Lincoln's request, Seward had drafted a
proposed final paragraph for the Inaugural Address:
I close. We are not we must not be aliens or enemies but fellow
countrymen and brethren. Although passion has strained our bonds
of affection too hardly they must not, I am sure they will not be
broken. The mystic chords which proceeding from so many battle
fields and so many patriot graves pass through all the hearts and all
the hearths in this broad continent of ours will yet again harmonize in
their ancient music when breathed upon by the guardian angel of the
nation.
Lincoln altered Seward's version as follows:
I am loth to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not
be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our
bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stre[t]ching from
every battlefield, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearth-
stone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union,
when again touched, as surely they will be; by the better angels of
our nature.
Just compare the two passages. Read them again. Read
them aloud. As Carl Sandburg understood and stated so
lucidly, Lincoln not only shortened what Seward had pro-
posed but "transmuted it into slightly different meaning and a
distinctly changed verbal music." Putting the matter more
bluntly, Lincoln produced a beautiful jewel while Seward's
product was flawed. Most persons approaching Lincoln's
genius for expression have not begun to match him in action as
well, and the reverse is equally true. The sixteenth president
was both natural leader and word artist. Eventually, in world
opinion, he would surpass Seward and every other American
politician of his era in the significance of both what he did
and what he said.
From the hour that Confederate cannoneers fired on Fort
Sumter in April 1861, Lincoln bent every effort to mobilize
and shape the forces of the Union. Although four additional
southern states joined the Confederacy in April and May, the
36
Abraham Lincoln as a lawyer in Springfield, Illinois, 1858
Courtesy of University Libraries, The University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln as president in 1865
Courtesy of Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum
Fort Wayne, Indiana
The Capitol during Lincoln's first inauguration, March 4, 1861
From Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper
-Zachary Taylor, an unfinished engraving on an 1848
daguerreotype. His Baton Rouge home is in the background.
Courtesy of the author
Zachary Taylor, a daguerreotype of the 1846-1850 period
Courtesy of Chicago Historical Society
Jetterson Davis as secretary of war (1853-1857)
Courtesy of Chicago Historical Society
Jefferson Davis as president of the Confederacy
Courtesy of the Mississippi Department of Archives and History
The inauguration of Jefferson Davis as president of the
Confederacy in Montgomery, Alabama, on February 18, 1861.
From In Memoriam Jefferson Davis (Charleston, S.C.:
Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co., 1890)
four slave commonwealths of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland,
and Missouri did not. Kentucky tried to be neutral, which was
one reason the president gave the state of his birth so much of
his attention.
As the Civil War proceeded, there was fighting in Kentucky
as well as in Missouri and Maryland—and of course much
combat in Virginia and farther south. Especially in the border-
land, brother bore arms against brother, and father against
son. Kentucky families like the Taylors, Clays, Crittendens,
and Breckinridges split down the middle. Still Lincoln's
1861-62 attempts to prevent the number of Confederate
states from increasing succeeded. And despite Lincoln's hav-
ing polled only 1,365 Kentucky votes, far more Kentuckians
saw fit to join the northern than the southern army.
In the East there was much to hearten the South in the
initial eighteen months of the struggle. The first battle of Bull
Run (mid-1861) can only be described as a northern disaster or
a southern success. Simon Cameron did a poor job as head of
the War Department. George B. McClellan, the young officer
then entrusted with weightier responsibilities than any other
Union general, performed ably as a trainer of troops but (in
Lincoln's words) suffered from "the slows" as a field comman-
der. In the spring of 1861 the Confederates moved their capi-
tal from Montgomery to Richmond. There were hopes in the
North that, in an elaborate 1862 campaign, McClellan could
not only score spectacular victories on the peninsula between
the James and York rivers but attack Richmond as well. Ten
weeks of hard fighting ensued in that storied Peninsular Cam-
paign. But the southern will to fight, southern leadership, and
southern troop dispositions dashed the expectations of Lincoln
and compelled McClellan's men to return north—their ob-
jectives unattained.
Lincoln's good judgment in supplanting Cameron with
Edwin M. Stanton went unmatched by his experiments with a
series of none too competent generals in the East. While
Union soldiers did not lose all their battles there, they lost
more than would have been the case under better direction.
In the western theater of operations, northern fortunes fared
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far more favorably. There a part of the North's advance de-
rived from the insight and gumption of Ulysses S. Grant, who
captured two key Tennessee forts and achieved other suc-
cesses. In April 1862, at Shiloh in west Tennessee, Confeder-
ates under Albert Sidney Johnston had Union regiments on
the run until Johnston was mortally wounded and the south-
erners consequently lost their momentum. On the second
bloody day at Shiloh, a reinforced Grant reversed the tide of
battle. The Souths invasion of Kentucky in the summer and
early fall of 1862 ended in Confederate retreat from the state
after the battle of Perryville.
More inspiring to the North than these events, however,
was the occupation of New Orleans in April 1862 by David
Glasgow Farragut. Leading naval units up the Mississippi
River from the Gulf of Mexico, this grizzled sea dog was re-
sponsible for an accomplishment more striking than anything
previously done by Union troops on land. Like Farragut and
Grant, Lincoln clearly saw the Mississippi's tremendous sig-
nificance to the war in the West. Thus, strategically, the fact
most favorable to the Union cause as a whole was the North's
control by summer's end of the entire river except for a 250-
mile stretch between Vicksburg and Port Hudson.
The president composed the Emancipation Proclamation in
the same period and then made it official on January 1, 1863.
Like a number of Lincoln's decisions, it was bound to be
controversial—and nowhere more than in Kentucky. "Ken-
tucky joined the Confederacy when the Civil War was over" is
an oft heard expression today. Yet Kentucky's increased em-
pathy with the seceded states really began when emancipation
was bruited.
Lincoln at the time was more deeply concerned about En-
gland and France than Lexington and Louisville. He wanted
to do all in his power to preserve British and French neu-
trality, and he believed that endorsement of a moral issue
would impress people and governments abroad. He also re-
garded the proclamation as having a practical military value,
because the only blacks emancipated by the document's pro-
visions were those residing in areas controlled by the Confed-
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eracy. As the northern forces pushed ahead, more and more of
the slaves would be freed, and it was thought that the prospect
of freedom would encourage slaves to become a disruptive
element behind enemy lines. Why should hundreds and thou-
sands of Kentuckians become so upset by something not im-
mediately affecting them? Because they considered the proc-
lamation a "foot in the door" for emancipation everywhere.
The year 1863 was significant in other ways. On July 4, John
C. Pemberton capitulated at Vicksburg to General Grant. As a
result of this and related developments, Lincoln soon was
warranted in exclaiming: "The Father of Waters again goes
unvexed to the sea." The evening of the same Fourth of July,
amid a torrential storm, Robert E. Lee headed toward the
Potomac after three days of fighting at Gettysburg. The de-
nouement of the Confederacy's Pennsylvania campaign, this
was another major Union victory, even though George G.
Meade's men were unable to pursue and capture the retreat-
ing southerners.
The business of killing continued for nearly two more years.
While some of the most ferocious slaughter occurred in Ten-
nessee and Georgia, by mid-1864 attention was mainly con-
centrated on the struggle in Virginia. With every imaginable
material advantage and consistently outnumbering his ill-
equipped foe, Grant (long since transferred from the West)
doggedly drove Lee back until on April 9, 1865, Marse Robert
surrendered at Appomattox. Meanwhile, the preceding
November, Lincoln had won reelection by 212-21 over the
Democrat McClellan. His second inauguration took place on
March 4, 1865. Lincoln lived until April 15, when he died
from a bullet wound inflicted by John Wilkes Booth at Ford's
Theater the night before.
By that time the Civil War was all but over, with Joseph E.
Johnston surrendering on April 26 and other Confederate
commanders following the Lee-Johnston example. Deaths of
southern uniformed personnel during the four-year struggle
totaled 164,981; northern fatalities were 359,528. Of these,
74,524 and 110,070 respectively were battlefield casualties.
Many northerners and southerners suffered serious or minor
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wounds, with some of the wounded to be handicapped
forever.
The monetary cost of the war to the Union is estimated at
$4,486,198,881—approximately four and a half billions. Pen-
sions and other veteran-related expenditures by the United
States government in after years involved huge additional out-
lays. The financial burdens of the South were so heavy that
they cannot even be estimated. After the surrender Con-
federate money and bonds were worthless. And the economic
plight of ruined individual southerners had no counterpart in
northern states.
The Civil War achieved Lincoln's principal purpose, the
preservation of the Union. Due partly to the Emancipation
Proclamation and partly to the Thirteenth Amendment (rati-
fied in December 1865), chattel slavery was abolished. North-
ern industry and commerce, impressive prior to the conflict,
boomed increasingly during and after it. The Civil War
ushered in an era when rail transportation and then steel
vastly expanded industrial growth. On numerous counts the
war constituted the most important event of the nineteenth
century in the Western Hemisphere.
From 1865 to 1900, and throughout the twentieth century
to date, the name of Abraham Lincoln has been honored as
the grand symbol of Union and freedom. As commander-in-
chief of approximately 2.25 million fellow Americans (most of
them civilians in uniform), he was held in respect by legions
of survivors for the duration of their lives. The Grand Army
of the Republic, a Union veterans' organization popular and
powerful for decades, had Lincoln as its principal hero. The
Republican party, not just every four years at its national
conventions but month in and month out utilizing the written
and spoken word, extolled the man who had borne its standard
in its first and second electoral triumphs. Rooks, articles, and
reproductions of oil paintings and photographs were exten-
sively circulated, bringing the Lincoln story and the Lincoln
likeness into millions of American homes. School children
memorized the Gettysburg Address, and in the pulpit and on
the platform familiar passages from other Lincoln speeches
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were extensively quoted and taken as texts. Moreover, not
mere popularity or respect but even reverence came to char-
acterize the way in which untold numbers of people regarded
Lincoln as the epitome of virtue. In many hearts and minds he
became sanctified.
The real-life Lincoln had wit and humor and could be
earth-earthy in the yarns he spun. The live Lincoln could
temporize and compromise when, in his best judgment, a
situation called for such expedients. The dead Lincoln, on the
other hand, often was "restored" in the mind's eye as a sort of
lay saint—an idealist who invariably took the high road—ever
right and never wrong. There was a tendency to lose sight of
the flesh-and-blood Lincoln in the fervor of idolatry. Biog-
raphers devoted to the truth had a wonderful tale to tell, but
they long experienced difficulties in re-creating the mortal
man with all the competition of the mythmakers.
In the course of his quadrennium in the White House,
Lincoln—like presidents preceding and following him—had
his full share of critics. He was caricatured as a gorilla, an ape,
a tyrant, a dictator, a buffoon.
While it was to be expected that many southerners would
dislike or even loathe the head of the adversary government,
men and women of embattled Dixie had no monopoly on the
anti-Lincoln harshness and hate. In the North even members
of his own party assailed him out loud or insidiously in whis-
pers. Radical Republicans like Thaddeus Stevens were them-
selves convinced, and sought to persuade others, that the
president was too moderate and too weak. Then, too, there
were war-weary northern Democrats and Republicans who
saw him as a bloodstained butcher thrusting young men in-
terminably into the maw of war, meanwhile chuckling at
cabinet sessions that "this reminds me of a little joke." History
records a period of strong opposition to Lincoln's second elec-
tion, and a time when he himself thought he would lose. His
most dangerous opponents, in the political context, were
neither southerners nor Democrats but Republicans, promi-
nently including some of Lincoln's own appointees.
The Lincoln of 1861—65, like the Lincoln of the backwoods
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and the prairies and the boy Lincoln of Kentucky, is a credible
Lincoln who merits far greater esteem than the icon of the
deifiers. His manner was humble, his humility genuine; yet
his genuineness did not eliminate either exemplary political
courage or a second quality of astute public men—the ability
to delay and watch and wait for the best opportunities to act
resolutely.
It is conceivable that the Union cause would have emerged
victorious, and that the slaves would have been freed, without
Lincoln in the presidency. But what we know—without a
shadow of doubtfulness obtruding—is that these events did
occur with the erstwhile one-term Whig congressman in
charge. Today most Americans count their nation fortunate
not only because unity was reattained and slavery abolished,
but also because the crisis gave Lincoln's contemporaries and
posterity such a remarkable exemplar.
PRESIDENT DAVIS
HE JEFFERSON DAVIS who took the oath as president of the
Confederate States of America, under the provisional ar-
rangements of February 1861, would have preferred another
role. Before his election at Montgomery, Mississippi had
named him the major-general in command of her troops. With
his West Point training and Mexican War background, his at-
traction to this assignment is not surprising. Still, the South
possessed a larger supply of military than executive talent.
One of Davis's undeniable career assets was his four-year rec-
ord as Secretary of War under Franklin Pierce. In the United
States Senate, too, he had gained a widespread reputation in
both South and North as a premier spokesman for his section;
had headed the Senate Military Affairs Committee; and had
become well acquainted with both northern and southern
leaders.
In view of the northern stereotype of Davis during and after
the Civil War as a traitor or southern archfiend, it is pertinent
to recall the respect in which he was held by many northerners
in antebellum times. Visiting New England for his health in
the summer of 1858, he had been invited to speak at Portland,
Maine, where he emphasized the "national sentiment and
fraternity which made us, and . . .  alone can keep us, one
people." That year Bowdoin College made him an honorary
doctor of laws.
Later in 1858, at a Democratic ratification meeting in Bos-
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ton's Faneuil Hall, the senator from Mississippi said: "If I
were selecting a place where the . . . extreme asserter of
democratic state rights doctrine should go for his text, I would
send him into the collections of your [Massachusetts] histori-
cal association. . . .  The great stone your fathers hewed . . .
[was] the fit foundation for a monument to state rights!" Da-
vis's Faneuil Hall remarks were applauded or cheered forty-
seven times. Among those favorably impressed by him on
that occasion was Benjamin F. Butler, the future Beast But-
ler or Spoons Butler of New Orleans notoriety, who at the
1860 Democratic National Convention in Charleston would
back Davis for president of the United States on fifty-seven
ballots.
It must not be imagined that Davis talked one way in Maine
and Massachusetts and New York (where he also drew re-
sounding cheers in 1858) and a different way in Mississippi or
the District of Columbia. Consistently he defended the in-
stitution and the constitutionality of slavery. Invariably his
major theme was the states' rights principle. Repeatedly he
made it clear that he did not favor secession except as a last
resort. And more than once he declared that he would approve
a North-South accommodation, provided fundamentals were
not abandoned, in lieu of plunging the American people into a
military bloodbath.
Nor was Davis considered anything like one of the most
extreme of southerners in the South itself. He was no fire-
brand of the type of South Carolina's Robert Barnwell Rhett,
Alabama's William L. Yancey, or Texas's Louis T. Wigfall. In
1861 no member of the latter group stood a chance for the
Confederacy's presidential post. Both Robert Toombs and
Howell Cobb of Georgia, and several others, had supporters
who preferred them for the office. Indeed, remote on his plan-
tation, Davis thought arrangements had been made for Cobb
to be selected. But in the minds of many influential men who
gathered that winter at Montgomery, Davis seemed the per-
son who—both ideologically and administratively—was best
qualified to perform the presidential duties.
The problems confronting Davis would have dismayed any-
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one deficient in the courage and determination he possessed.
The total population of the eleven Confederate states added
up to approximately 9 million (including 3.5 million slaves),
compared with nearly 19 million in the nineteen free states
and 3.1 million in the four slave states which did not break
with the Union. The South had only one-quarter of the coun-
try's wealth, one-eighth of the manufacturing, and less than
one-third of the 30,000 miles of railway track. In shipping, as
in banking and industrial productivity, the South was at a simi-
lar disadvantage. And so the story went in numerous material
categories, having a direct bearing on the conduct and the out-
come of a colossal struggle.
Another big handicap for the Confederacy was that it was a
new nation. It had no governmental structure created over a
period of years. Brick by brick, and inch by inch, it had to be
built from the foundation up. Worst of all, as matters evolved,
it was essential to accomplish so trying a task while concur-
rently waging a war.
At the outset Davis seems to have expected a long, hard
war. But, like Lincoln and his advisers, Davis and other
southern leaders hoped the conflict would be short. Like so
many southerners, they plaped great confidence in southern
generals and (most of all) in the South's military tradition. For
roughly one year the Confederacy did hold advantages in
those respects. Initially, there was a certain amount of evi-
dence bolstering the hope that northerners were unwilling to
make substantial sacrifices for the Union cause. Many south-
ern people saw the North as a region which put priorities on
manufacturing and shopkeeping, with its men intent on mak-
ing money and deficient in the martial spirit.
In late 1860 and early 1861 such respected northern
spokesmen as Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune of-
fered the opinion that southern states should be permitted to
"go in peace" if it was their judgment that they could do better
outside the Union than in it. "Whenever a considerable sec-
tion of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out," Greeley
asserted, "we shall resist all coercive measures designed to
keep it in." Even Winfield Scott, the aged general at the head
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of the United States Army when Lincoln and Davis came into
power, had thoughts and feelings akin to the journalist's.
"All we ask is to be let alone," Davis told the Confederate
Congress on April 29, and "that those who never held power
over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms." Yet
the depart-in-peace solution or quasi-solution quickly gave
way to sterner views above the Mason-Dixon Line after the
firing on Fort Sumter. Assuredly the North would not, and did
not, let the South alone. Both Lincoln and Davis called up
troops—the former 75,000 and the latter 100,000. Combat
and preparation for combat permeated northern policy and
programs after the first battle of Bull Run. And so the Confed-
eracy, with all the disadvantages mentioned here and others
comparably deterministic, came face to face with the reality
that a long war stretched ahead.
Ah, but did not the South possess one impressive economic
asset in the midst of all the evident liabilities? "Cotton is
king!" the most optimistic of the southerners proclaimed.
Were not the cotton mills of Massachusetts dependent on the
staple from southern fields? Would not the inaccessibility of
the raw material hamstring New England's manufacturing of
finished products, deprive northerners of essential textiles,
and play hob with the North's economy as a whole? It was
arguable, too, that Britain, France, and other European coun-
tries would go on needing American cotton and buying it in
large quantities as in the past.
Even with southern coasts blockaded by the United States
Navy, could not the Confederacy rely upon—and profit
from—a flourishing British and French trade by running the
blockade and resorting to other expedients? Britain and
France, furthermore, might have something to say on the sub-
ject of northern attempts to interfere with international trade,
perhaps even siding with the southern cause diplomatically
and militarily.
Thus roseate expectations of wishful thinkers had a place
in the Confederacy alongside pessimists' gloom, just when
southern field performance, chiefly in Virginia, brought a
tingle of pride and a glow of confidence to southern soldiers
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and noncombatants alike. Somehow green recruits were uni-
formed, trained, and battle-hardened. Somehow the Tredegar
Iron Works at Richmond and other establishments performed
miracles of arms production. Somehow Confederate vessels,
adopting hit-and-run tactics, assaulted and damaged and
burned northern shipping. Confederate heroes—how knight-
like they seemed, and how inspirational to the men they led.
Robert E. Lee and Albert Sidney Johnston in particular re-
sembled cavaliers of old, champions in shining armor, devo-
tees to the cause.
Unlike Lincoln, Davis had long enjoyed acquaintance with
scores of the most resourceful officers in America. Many
southern generals were his warm personal friends. Not a few
he had known as a West Point cadet. The president of the
Confederacy had faith in the abilities of commanders whose
development he had professionally observed. He frequently
stood by them even when critics grew impatient with them or
found fault with their performances. Witness the case of Al-
bert Sidney Johnston when, after Fort Donelson's fall, the
Tennessee General Assembly dispatched a delegation to Davis
requesting the removal of Johnston "because he is no gen-
eral." If Johnston "is not a general," the president replied,
"we had better give up the war, for we have no general."
One of the complaints lodged against Davis, by contem-
poraries and by scholars, concerned this very trait of loyalty to
subordinates. In Johnston's case such criticism on the part of
historians has not been pervasive for the simple reason that
Johnston at Shiloh—to the moment of his tragic death—
acquitted himself magnificently. The president, however, also
saw virtues in Braxton Bragg which other people failed to dis-
cern, and he was criticized for giving Bragg assignments which
more logically might have been bestowed elsewhere. The case
of Lucius B. Northrop has been widely considered another
example of misplaced confidence.
Secondly, Davis's relations with Joseph E. Johnston and P.
G. T. Beauregard have long been debated in scholarly circles.
As the war went on, it became evident that both these gener-
als hated the president. There were times when each of them
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functioned or failed to function in ways which, in Davis's view,
harmed the war effort. But, as each had a very vocal clique in
the Confederate Congress, there were important occasions
when Davis entrusted them with heavy responsibilities de-
spite grave personal reservations. Indeed, it may be said that
Davis erred more seriously in turning the other cheek to his
enemies than in lending support to his friends.
A third kind of criticism stemmed from Davis's real or al-
leged interference with procedures in the field. One point of
attack has to do with the supplanting of Joseph Johnston with
John Bell Hood after the former fell back in Georgia as the
forces of William T. Sherman advanced. Here the accusation
is that Hood wasted the opportunities for an effective counter-
attack husbanded by his predecessor. Yet Davis's admirers
underscore his record in connection with Robert E. Lee, stat-
ing that it reflects creditably on the president's readiness to
delegate when a general was worthy of delegation. Here we
are discussing a degree of confidence such as Davis had earlier
reposed in the command capacity of Sidney Johnston. Clearly,
Lee respected Davis just as Davis respected Lee. The latter
received tremendous military and moral encouragement from
his fellow West Pointer in the Confederate executive mansion.
A fourth allegation, popular with some writers concentrat-
ing on the war in the West, is that many southern units ought
to have been transferred from Virginia to Tennessee. The
contention has been that the Army of Tennessee remained
undermanned at a juncture when Lee could have spared a por-
tion of his troops. Such reinforcements, so the story goes,
would have increased the problems of Sherman and of Grant
(before he came east) giving the Confederacy a better oppor-
tunity to score Tennessee or Georgia victories in lieu of the
defeats that eventuated. Was Lee a victim of military myopia,
limiting his vision to the needs of his own native Virginia? Was
Davis guilty of a major executive error in permitting Lee's
judgment to prevail? Those questions are answered affirma-
tively by this segment of the critics.
Davis's vulnerability to critical fire in his role as command-
er-in-chief was and is greatest in regard to strategy. It has
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been stated that the president, and therefore the Confeder-
acy, was too defense-minded at the start of the fighting and
remained too defense-minded throughout. The accusation is
made despite Lee's Maryland thrust in 1862 and his Pennsyl-
vania incursion the next year—efforts halted by Union succes-
ses at Antietam and Gettysburg. Both during and after the
war, particularly telling charges have been directed against
Davis's record respecting Vicksburg. A strong case may be
made that there was a stage, during Grant's preparations to
besiege the Mississippi city, when most of John C. Pember-
ton's command could have been withdrawn to fight elsewhere
another day. Also it has been repeatedly argued that, unlike
Lincoln, Davis failed to comprehend the enormous im-
portance of controlling the Mississippi River. Here, it is em-
phasized, the military amateur in the Washington White
House proved infinitely more prescient than the West Point
alumnus.
In studying Davis in the military overview, several sig-
nificant positive features should be identified. Despite formid-
able opposition, he insisted on the formation of a national
army controlled by national—not state—authority. He proved
practical, too, in resorting to conscription. He used slaves as
auxiliaries and, finally, as soldiers. Much may be presented in
favor of his "offensive-defensive" concept as well-suited to the
states' rights attitudes of southerners. And his judgment re-
garding a departmental command system, later expanded into
something of a theater command system, anticipated related
developments by the United States during World War II. A
big negative point is contained in the charge that Davis in-
sisted on running military operations himself. Primarily an
adviser to the president, Bragg was not a general-in-chief in
the sense that Grant became Lincoln's general-in-chief. Only
within a few weeks of its collapse did the Confederacy create
such a position. And then it was too late to test its utility.
Of all the complaints against Davis, none has been projected
more often than the political failing that he did not get along
well with the Confederate Congress, with several influential
southern governors, or with Vice President Alexander H.
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Stephens. Blame for the friction with Stephens, or for Davis's
chain of troubles with Georgia's Joseph E. Brown and North
Carolina's Zebulon B. Vance, probably should not be laid at
the president's door, for he was far more sinned against than
sinning. But Davis assuredly could have performed with
greater deftness, patience, and success in his congressional
relationships. Eloquent when addressing crowds of citizens,
and capable of warmth and magnetism in man-to-man contacts
or within small groups, Davis appeared to poorest advantage
in state papers addressed to the Confederate Congress and in
dealing with many representatives and senators. This may
have been due to an assumption on Davis's part that there was
no need to cajole congressmen, with oratorical or other tricks
or glosses, into doing what their minds and hearts should have
told them was the right thing to do—a perilous assumption for
any chief executive!
It is nearly always easier to discover flaws in a loser than in a
winner. This is particularly true when the man who won was
the revered, patriarchal Lincoln. Still it should be recalled
that during the Civil War Davis was not the only occupant of a
presidential office who committed mistakes.
Lincoln made some terribly poor choices, especially in re-
gard to the politicians—utterly unqualified to lead troops—
whom he often plucked from civil life and entrusted with
brigadier-generalships. Even more unfortunate were Lin-
coln's selections of Ambrose E. Burnside and Joseph Hooker
to head the Army of the Potomac. Nathaniel P. Banks demon-
strated incapacity in the course of the Red River campaign,
and there are additional examples. The day did come when
Lincoln fully recognized the worth of the Grants, the Sher-
mans, and the George H. Thomases. Such able professionals
were then given the responsibilities due them. But, mean-
while, a sorry assortment of incompetents jeopardized and lost
thousands of lives.
In the final year the North-South inequalities of manpower,
materiel, and resources placed the Confederacy at an ever
greater disadvantage. The marvel is that the South remained
in the contest as long and tenaciously as it did. Somehow the
50
southern people endured forty-eight months of hardship and
horror. True, they were fighting for home and fireside against
infinitely more powerful invaders. But surely part of the credit
for their heroic showing should go to the Confederate leader-
ship.
What of the personality of Davis, first as the South's pro-
visional president and then when he headed her "permanent"
government? He has been portrayed as too stiff an official, too
inflexible a decision-maker, and deficient in the graces that
tended to make Lincoln lovable even when engaged in the
business of directing organized slaughter. Davis was "cold"—
his "coldness" the more frigid when compared with Lincoln's
warming glow; such is the stereotyped Jefferson Davis.
Yet there is proof in his earlier years that Davis was not cold
at all. During much of the war he suffered from what was
called neuralgia. Anyone who has experienced neuralgic pain
is aware that being sunny and warm and consistently friendly
while undergoing that type of torture is exceedingly difficult.
But the neuralgia was not constant. There were many days and
weeks of relief. And numerous witnesses have testified that
resilience (rather than stiffness) and a willingness to consider
conflicting opinions (instead of an inflexible attitude) charac-
terized Davis time and again.
When the Confederacy lost, its president tried to avoid cap-
ture. He failed. Again we have a caricature: "Jeff Davis wear-
ing women's clothes" when taken prisoner by the Yankees. He
did have a shawl around his shoulders, but the "hoop skirt"
and other figments of fiction—nothing of the sort. Davis then
was committed to prison, remained there many months, and
long was subjected to indignities and even cruelties under
which the body and spirit of a less courageous soul would have
collapsed.
Davis did not collapse. Bruised, he was not broken, but
lived twenty-four years after his southland laid down its
weapons. Spending a short period in Canada, he went to
Europe five times—part of his purpose being to find a  busi-
ness position with a British firm in America. Frustrated on this
score, and virtually without funds, he accepted the presidency
51
of a Memphis insurance company which failed through no
fault of his own. Now and then in his last years, he made
public appearances in the South and was greeted with respect
and applause and emotional tributes by those whose leader he
had been. He also traveled as far west as Colorado and twice
visited his Kentucky birthplace. Davis was eighty-one years
old when the end came peacefully in New Orleans on De-
cember 6, 1889.
There is something about dying at the peak of a crisis that
has the effect, in the cases of many historic figures, of
lengthening statures and enhancing reputations. This was not
the case with Taylor because the 1850 crisis had not developed
all the way to belligerency that steamy summer. Taylor, too,
did not die at an assassin's hand, but rather from natural
causes. All the circumstances surrounding Lincoln's death
were different. Here was the victor, here the hero of the
greatest war, here the "Father Abraham" of the boys in blue,
shot without warning by a Confederate sympathizer at the
zenith of the Union's success. The first presidential assassina-
tion, the killing of Lincoln inspired eulogists to extol the mar-
tyred chieftain in city after city and town after town. Amid
unprecedented sable pageantry, Lincoln the president was
apotheosized—and Lincoln the man likewise.
No such special setting or unusual circumstance attended
the death of Davis. It might be supposed that he "had lived
too long" to be remembered, and that his passing in his
eighty-second year would seem but an incident in men's
minds. Yet to New Orleans, people came by the thousands
to gaze on Davis's classic features for the final time and to
attend his funeral service.
Throughout the South, from Virginia to Texas, bells tolled
and minute guns were fired; and in church and assembly hall
and mansion and cottage, deep and pervading grief was felt.
Messages of consolation then reached, and later continued to
reach, the widow from large numbers of sympathizers includ-
ing her husband's former slaves. A gray-bearded college friend
from the Transylvania days who had served with the deceased
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in the United States Senate journeyed to the Crescent City
from a far-off northern place and stood tearfully among the
bereaved. The last surviving member of Davis's West Point
class likewise was among those present. Fourteen of the fifty
pallbearers were Confederate generals. And the vast as-
semblage of other mourners—at least fifty thousand of
them—bore mute testimony to the esteem in which Davis was
held by fellow southerners. Never in the annals of the South
had a funeral been so largely attended.
"Jefferson Davis," declared the New York Times, "will live
longer in history and better than will any who have ever spo-
ken against him." "He was the chosen chieftain," said the New
York World, "of the new Republic which strove to establish
itself, and whose adherents battled for its existence with a
heroism the memory of which is everywhere cherished as one
that does honor to the American character and name. . . .  He
sacrificed all for the cause he cherished, and he alone of all the




IN NORTHERN PORTIONS of the United States before, during,
and after the Civil War, propagandists fostered the impression
that an insidious "Slave Power" brought on the conflict and did
so for the purpose of perpetuating the South's "peculiar in-
stitution." At best, this was an oversimplification of an ex-
tremely complex congeries of issues. Indeed, a strong case can
be made that there never was a monolithic "Slave Power."
And, even if one rejects the denial in a debate over definitions
of terms, it is certain that numerous factors besides activities
of slavery proponents figured prominently among the reasons
for the four years of fighting under Lincoln and Davis.
This view is not tantamount to dismissing slavery as a major
cause of the Civil War. No matter what southern congressmen
might aver, and no matter what the Supreme Court might
hold, ownership and control of one human being by another
seemed to many people then—as they still seem today—ut-
terly incompatible with American fundamentals. Thus many
citizens became antislavery. And to that segment of those
disapproving of slavery known as abolitionists, antislavery
essentially was a moral cause transcending constitutional con-
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siderations and most other political concerns. Slavery was
sin, said abolitionists, who (as their name indicated) sought
with every means at their disposal to abolish that sin.
There was an essential difference, however, between aboli-
tionists on one hand and most northern citizens on the other.
To nearly all northerners, as well as southerners, a highly
important guiding fact was the Constitution's protection of
slavery in fifteen states of the federal Union. This enormous
majority, utterly unlike the relatively few abolitionists, re-
spected constitutionality and even as late as 1860 made no
move to abolish slavery in the states where it was legal.
While the 1819-21 Missouri Controversy was, in Thomas
Jefferson's words, a "firebell in the night," from 1822 through
1844 other issues attracted more attention than slavery in
the political arena. But after the annexation of Texas and
during and after the Mexican War large numbers of northern
politicians and voters embraced a cause related to aboli-
tionism, though in no sense synonymous with it. This was
the cause of opposition to the extension of slavery.
In the post-1845 period, the antiextension drive first con-
centrated on the western and southwestern lands acquired
from Mexico in 1848. Secondly, it shifted to that part of the soil
obtained in the Louisiana Purchase and involved in the repeal
of the Missouri Compromise. Initially adherents of the Free
Soil party and then those of the far larger Republican party
made slavery's containment within fifteen states the number-
one plank of quadrennial platforms. This was the principal
public issue in the congressional debates of 1850, in the Kan-
sas-Nebraska embroilment of 1854, and in the 1860 election
that brought Abraham Lincoln into the White House.
Unlike Lincoln or Zachary Taylor, Jefferson Davis had an
opportunity to discuss the Civil War's causation long after
hostilities ended. In The Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government, he traced points of agreement and difference
between South and North from the era of the Declaration of
Independence all the way to the firing on Fort Sumter.
The essence of Davis's statement was that "each of the
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States, as sovereign parties to the compact of Union, had the
reserved power to secede from it whenever it should be found
not to answer the ends for which it [the Union] was estab-
lished." What were those ends? They prominently included
the "unalienable rights of man," the "sovereignty of the peo-
ple," and the "supremacy of law." All these were predicated
upon man's prior allegiance to his state, vis-a-vis the United
States, which in Davis's view definitely was not the sovereign.
"The temper of the Black Republicans is not to give us our
rights in the Union, or allow us to go peaceably out of it," he
wrote on January 13, 1861. "If we had no other cause, this
would be enough to justify secession, at whatever hazard."
This still was Davis's opinion when death came to him nearly
twenty-nine years later.
In The Rise and Fall Davis likewise said that, in various
North-South relationships over a span of seven decades from
the 1770s to the 1840s, the "existence of African servitude"
was in no wise a cause of conflict, but "only an incident." In
subsequent controversies, however, slavery's "effect in operat-
ing as a lever upon the passions, prejudices, or sympathies of
mankind . . . was so potent that it has been spread, like a
thick cloud, over the whole horizon of historic truth." In his
own words, therefore, although in a roundabout way, Davis
admitted that slavery was a factor in the 1861-65 denouement.
Omitted from the Davis assertion is the truth that, if slavery
had not existed, there would have been no controversy over its
extension. In the sense of acknowledging extension or con-
tainment as the most evident question in men's thoughts and
actions, we find ourselves recognizing the institution of slavery
per se as an undeniable cause of war.
But slavery was not the sole reason for the four-year strug-
gle. Among the many other causes were the pride, zeal, and
hatred felt by many northerners and southerners as Armaged-
don approached. There undoubtedly was much intolerance
from Maine to Texas and from Florida to Minnesota. Eco-
nomic, cultural, philosophical, and psychological considera-
tions were not negligible. The publication of Uncle Tom's
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Cabin, the lies and truths and exaggerations emanating from
"Bleeding" Kansas (regarding which ink flowed more freely
than blood), the shrillness of speeches in and out of Congress,
and the "martyrdom" of John Brown all contributed to an at-
mosphere of emotional excess. Some northerners had fantastic
notions of the slave-labor system. Some southerners supposed
the North would not fight successfully, if at all, in the event of
secession. Thus fateful forms of ignorance were present on
both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line.
A great deal may be said in favor of Davis's constitutional
credo, which was also the basic belief of many of his fellow
southern leaders. But, examining the situation in practical
rather than theoretical terms, it is also permissible to
speculate—over a century after the killing and being
killed—whether southern interest might not have retained
much protection if the South had remained in the Union.
Slavery was not seen as the only southern interest. It is
probable that, even with full southern delegations seated in
Congress, a heavily protective tariff would have been enacted
and signed into law, benefiting the manufacturing North to the
disadvantage of the agricultural South. With ever-increasing
majorities in both the Senate and the House, northerners also
could have imposed other legislation detrimental to south-
erners.
Yet, with a very large and ever-vocal and alert minority
representing southern wishes on Capitol Hill, it is extremely
doubtful that anything resembling total northern dominance
would have developed prior to the passing of many decades. It
ought to be realized, too, that the Democratic party would
have remained a national party—and, in all probability, the
only national party—for a long time. Even after the Civil War
and despite conditions of Reconstruction voting, the Republi-
can nominee in 1868 managed to win the presidency against a
weak Democratic opponent by only a tiny popular margin. In
1876, 1880, 1884, 1888, and 1892, history records that post-
Civil War Democratic candidates performed creditably in the
era of the bloody shirt. And, concurrently, Democratic con-
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gressional strength proved impressive. What might the South
have achieved, within the Democratic fold, if men like Davis
had been willing to theorize less and calculate more?
What might have been the ultimate fate of slavery in such
circumstances? Scholars have debated how profitable it was in
the states where it was legal, and also whether it would have
been profitable in various regions of the West. If southern
commonwealths had not seceded, slavery would have con-
tinued there for a time. How long, nobody knows. The au-
thor's opinion is that it would have been eliminated around
the turn of the century, probably with considerable fuss but
without slaughter a la 1861-65. Someone else may think dif-
ferently. But, regardless of slavery's fate and in the light of
points made in the preceding paragraph, it appears certain
that the South would have fared better from the 1860s to the
1890s if the Confederacy had never been created.
Still another telling consideration regarding southern power
within the federal government has to do with congressional
committees in the last third of the nineteenth century and the
first two-thirds of the twentieth century. We all know that,
starting in the 1870s and 1880s, the South reaped a variety of
advantages by keeping House and Senate members in Con-
gress for long spans of time. One result was that, during those
periods when Democrats possessed Senate and House
majorities, most congressional committees were chaired by
southerners. And when Republican majorities prevailed, the
ranking members of committee minorities similarly hailed
from the South and made their influence felt. It is not far-
fetched to say that, if secession was the most serious misstep
southerners made, their exploitation of the seniority system
on Capitol Hill was most representative of southern shrewd-
ness. As this quest for disproportionate southern power turned
out to be achievable despite the outcome of the Civil War,
might it not have worked to even more spectacular advantage
without a Sumter or an Appomattox?
Hindsight strongly suggests that both Abraham Lincoln and
Zachary Taylor were more practical men than Jefferson Davis.
By northern consolidated-state standards, they were Unionists
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—and therefore patriots—and he was not. Davis, neverthe-
less, would forever deny any doubts about his devotion to the
Union as he interpreted the Union. Throughout the Civil
War, he and like-minded southerners customarily avoided the
word Union when referring to the adversary government or to
adversary armies. He believed in a Union with a right of
secession. Long after relinquishing the Confederate
presidency, he wrote, "I recognize the fact that the war
showed . . .  secession . . . to be impracticable, but this did
not prove it to be wrong."
Abraham Lincoln today is considered America's greatest
president both in scholarly circles and by the general public.
Assuredly, he merits lofty rank. What many moderns forget,
however, is that in the 1840s Lincoln said, "Any people any-
where being inclined and having the power have the right to
rise up and shake off the existing government, and form one
that suits them better." He said nothing of the sort in 1860 or
1861. In 1858, Lincoln declared that he was not "in favor of
bringing about in any way the social and political equality of
the white and black races." To what extent does that statement
accord with the convictions of some of his modern admirers?
In 1860, Lincoln opposed inclusion of an anti-Fugitive Slave
Law plank in the Republican platform—and in line with his
wishes the plank was excluded. This is interesting in light of
the emphasis placed on the law's iniquities by many anti-
slavery persons. On his journey to Washington in 1861, the
president-elect told audience after audience that peace would
not give way to war. Did Lincoln believe what he repeatedly
asserted? There is no strong evidence to the contrary. Yet
before long, as President, he was writing, "The tug of war has
to come, and better now than at any time hereafter."
In the totality of Lincoln's expressions prior to the firing on
Fort Sumter, there is nothing like the degree of consistency
found in the totality of Davis's expressions. Was Davis's con-
sistency foolish, reminiscent of the Emersonian adage that "A
foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds . . ."?
Surely, only a cynic would think so. But, as we have seen, the
bulk of Lincoln's reputation rests upon his post-Sumter, not
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his pre-Sumter, record. If the problems he faced in the pres-
idential chair were by no means as enormous as those Davis
confronted, Lincoln certainly met and mastered them. His
mistakes proved incidental in the long run. Time and time
again, in challenge after challenge, he demonstrated extra-
ordinarily sound judgment both in his relations with Congress
and the public and in his role as commander-in-chief.
Yet soundness of judgment alone was not enough to lift
Lincoln to the heights of popular esteem. Having the asset of
an unusual personality, he managed, without the advantages
of television or radio, to project his individualistic image to the
northern populace as a whole. His common sense, decency,
seeming simplicity, and anecdotal glosses on complex topics
not only reached fellow Americans, but also sold and resold
men and women on the proposition that he was the right
person for his power and place. A few of his predecessors and
successors have rivaled Lincoln on this score, but no other
president has surpassed him—and it is doubtful that any has
been his equal—on a sustained basis.
Appealing to, gaining, and then retaining the support and
devotion of so substantial a constituency, Lincoln had two
types of assets in his dealings with members of Congress.
First, he was already clothed with presidential authority—
including patronage power, which was bound to be far more
awesome in wartime than amid scenes of peace. At least
equally consequential, senators and representatives knew that
Lincoln (unlike Pierce and Buchanan) was sustained by the
people, and that to oppose him meant running a risk of incur-
ring popular resentment. Lincoln, moreover, often was antic-
ipatory. This may be considered a third major asset, for re-
peatedly he gave evidence that his sense of timing could be
letter perfect. Possessing sizable advantages over Davis to
start with, Lincoln knew how to make the most of them. Thus,
capitalizing on conditions that favored him, he skirted the bogs
and quicksands of dissension and led the nation to victory.
History teachers are aware how easy it is to rivet students'
attention on colorful events—wars, revolutions, and the
like—and how hard to arouse comparable interest in long-
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range causes of dramatic developments. The inceptions of
problems, the ifs and might-have-beens, often fail to make an
impact on students, even when the material is presented with
skill. This generalization applies to adult, as well as youthful,
minds. And an excellent example of the fact exists in the
America of the 1970s in the contrast between most citizens'
knowledge of the Civil War and their ignorance concerning
the war's antecedents.
Because no war came in 1850, the crisis of that year arouses
few emotions, inspires few thoughts, and is a blur in too many
brains. The historically discredited concept of a nonexistent
"Clay Compromise" remains a widely accepted stereotype.
Despite the activities of Henry Clay in the spotlight on
Capitol Hill, there was no Whig compromise and there was no
"Clay Compromise," and any person professing the contrary is
unfamiliar with what occurred. While Clay and his fellow con-
gressional Whigs did contribute to the 1850 adjustment, the
compromise was essentially a Democratic one—with the
Clay-Whig contributions merely supplemental.
If most moderns fail to grasp such fundamentals, what hope
is there that they will comprehend Zachary Taylor's significant
role in the 1850 setting? Taylor was one of only 1,800 south-
erners owning as many as a hundred slaves. Thus did he not
belong to what might be considered a socioeconomic southern
elite or, in current jargon, the "southern establishment"? Had
there been a monolithic "Slave Power," surely Taylor's in-
vestments in plantations and slaves qualified him to be part of
that power. As president of the United States, was not this
well-to-do planter and slaveholder in a position to work and
scheme to great effect in accordance with the aims of so many
of his class?
Instead of fitting neatly into such a stereotype, Zachary
Taylor did just the opposite. Instead of contributing to the
alleged endeavors of the nonexistent "Slave Power," he com-
mitted his administration to the containment of slavery. He
did not do so through any declared approval of the Wilmot
Proviso, which explicitly called for slavery's exclusion from the
West and Southwest. But, unquestionably, the desired end
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product of Taylor's policy and actions was identical with the
goal of the Proviso's supporters. Lincoln was one of Taylor's
contemporaries who understood what was going on. If that
had not been the case, it is inconceivable that Lincoln would
have lauded Taylor in the language penned for delivery at
Chicago's city hall.
When all except two northern Whigs in the Senate lined up
in support of Taylor's plan, and when numerous northern
Whigs in the House did the same, the president's position as
an antiextension leader was clearly observable. Then Taylor
died. His fellow Whig, Fillmore, adopted a diametrically con-
trary stand so far as compromising was concerned. Stephen A.
Douglas, Democrat from Illinois, emerged from the wings of
the congressional stage. Douglas and his fellow Democrats—
aided by the Whigs Clay, Fillmore, and Webster, but not by
the Democrat Davis—pushed the Compromise of 1850
through the Senate and the House. Thus they substantially
reduced the immediate prospect of civil strife.
It is highly probable that, had Taylor lived, his blunt
Lincoln-like nationalism would have triumphed over any
Texas sortie against Santa Fe and would have defeated any
other challenge to United States authority. Some historians
have set forth their beliefs in the logic of such a development.
According to James Schouler, Taylor "saw more clearly the
bold headlands of national policy . . .  than the wisest and
world-renowned of our statesmen." Edward Channing
agreed: "It seems not impossible that . . . Taylor . . .  had
more political prescience than the most veteran political war
horses of them all." George Fort Milton believed, "The stern
determined character of Old Rough and Ready' made it more
than likely that the revolt would not have gotten so far and
taken so long as the Civil War itself."
Some later writers have disagreed, prominent among them
Allan Nevins who characterized Taylor as "wrongheaded. ' If
Taylor was wrongheaded in 1850, one may respectfully in-
quire, how could Lincoln have been so rightheaded in 1861?
Did economic, social, or political changes between those two
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critical years override in importance the similarities in princi-
ple of Taylor's and Lincoln's nationalism?
In the South, of course, Taylor became very unpopular dur-
ing his presidential months. Deceased, he remained unpopu-
lar there. Most antiextension people in the North, moreover,
failed to make a hero of him in the years following his death.
Why? Because, as they grew increasingly critical of the South
as a whole, they could not equate the attitude and action of the
Louisiana-Mississippi slaveholder with the cherished "Slave
Power" fiction. So it was that, had it not been for a few scholars
who brushed aside propaganda mists and uncovered realities,
the twelfth president would have remained forever in a histor-
ical no-man's-land claimed by neither South nor North.
To no such extent has either Davis or Lincoln ever been a
candidate for limbo or obscurity. A plausible case may be
made that the relationships of the two Civil War presidents to
other state and regional influences—as well as to Kentucky
associations—have appeared to readers of their biographies to
account largely for their prewar and wartime postures. For
example, it is sensible to think that eight years of Mississippi
isolation and study and the exclusive intellectual companion-
ship of his brother turned Davis away from Kentucky—and
from northwestern-oriented westernness—in the direction of
the southernness he ultimately embraced. And, surely, we
have no difficulty in finding that Lincoln's experiences in an
Indiana-Illinois environment verified and extended his Ken-
tucky frontier westernness.
An equally important reason for the dispelling of obscurity
or confusion about Lincoln and Davis is that the historio-
graphic focus on the Civil War has been so sharp. Succeeding
generations have not always interpreted all the 1861-65 ac-
tions and words, motivations and hopes, of Davis and Lincoln
in exactly the same way. There have been substantial scholarly
and literary divergences. Yet interest in the wartime scene has
been so constant and so keen that, in one study or another,
most fundamentals concerning the leaders have come to light.
Not so in the case of Taylor, who had been dead for over a
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decade when the Civil War began and who was president in a
period which has seemed far less dramatic to the public as a
whole—and (probably for that reason) has been less frequently
and less intensively scrutinized.
Years before he acquired Deep South land, Zachary Taylor
was a nationalist to the core. He grew up in Kentucky when
Kentuckians identified themselves at least as much with the
West as with the South, under frontier conditions and with
frontier outlooks. In his first important military achievement,
he defended the Northwest against foes of the federal Union.
Thereafter, for decades, his army service took him to North-
west and Southwest alike, reinforcing his boyhood western-
ness and making him a westerner and a nationalist through and
through.
It is true that Taylor came of age in a slave state and that his
father was a slaveholder. It is also true that, when young, he
himself acquired slaves; and, when older, he purchased more
of them.
Yet there is nothing whatever in his record to indicate
that private economic interests—linked with slavery or cot-
ton or anything else—overslaughed his devotion to the Union
at any point, or dictated his stand on public questions. Eco-
nomic determinists will forever have difficulty in reconcil-
ing Taylor's presidential posture, like that of Andrew Jackson
regarding South Carolina, with the slightest semblance of
selfishness. In Taylor, America had a Kentucky-reared chief
executive who—through Jackson-like and Lincoln-like presi-
dential Unionism—sought to avoid what his son-in-law Davis
and his staunch adherent Lincoln at length became so deeply
engaged in: the killing and maiming of hundreds of thousands
of America's young men.
Epilogue
<_/OME READERS will doubtless agree that the interplay of
these three personalities and what they stood for might be
hard to accept as true-to-life if Lincoln, Davis, and Taylor had
never existed and were presented to the public in a novel or
on the stage. That history is stranger than fiction is so truistic
that the assertion has long been regarded as banal. Yet rarely
has a playwright or a novelist dealt with materials more replete
with drama than the Lincoln-Davis-Taylor intertwinings.
Take, for instance, the mathematical odds against Davis's
fighting in Mexico under the command of his former father-
in-law. Consider the degree of improbability that the Brier-
field anchorite would rival the general as a Buena Vista hero.
Think of the mutual respect and affection of the two men in
1849-50, when they—so antipathetic in the past—disagreed
completely on the country's prime issue.
Turn, then, to all the similarities (in the midst of expected
dissimilarities) in the Davis-Lincoln lives before 1861, and in
the triumphs, disasters, and sorrows of the southern and
northern commanders in chief. Finally, reexamine the words
and phrases chosen in Chicago by ex-Congressman Lincoln for
the purpose of extolling Taylor. In describing Taylor's presi-
dential record, Lincoln uncannily forecast his own.
Think, too, of the turns of history causing one of these three
persons to become a Southerner with western affiliations who
served as the president of the Confederacy; one of them a
Westerner with southern affiliations who won election to the
presidency of the United States; and one of them a kind of
transcendent Westerner whom many Americans today see as
the greatest of our presidents. All had roots in the western-
southern Kentucky experience.
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The author hopes this book will help dispel a number of
half-truths and total misconceptions concerning the trio herein
discussed. If that hope is realized, and if in the process the
history of Kentucky and the Union is clarified, he will feel
abundantly rewarded.
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